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HOSPITAL MERGERS VERSUS CONSUMERS: AN ANTITRUST 
ANALYSIS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The hospital industry has recently experienced an unprecedented 
wave of mergers, acquisitions, and other forms of consolidation. In 
1996, 235 transactions involving 768 hospitals took place.! From 1994 
through 1996, nearly 40% of the nation's 5,200 non-federal hospitals 
were involved in some type of merger or acquisition activity. 2 Al-
though the numbers for 1997 dropped, they were still significant: 217 
transactions involving 627 hospitals. 3 In addition, the size of mergers 
and the number of hospitals controlled by one system are rising.4 
The merger wave includes for-profit hospitals, non-profit hospitals, 
and religiously affiliated hospitals.5 Catholics for a Free Choice 
("CFFC") identified fifty-seven mergers and affiliations between Cath-
olic and non-Catholic providers between 1990 and 1995.6 In a 1998 
study update, CFFC identified an additional thirty-eight completed 
consolidations between Catholic and non-Catholic hospitals, with 
twenty more pending.7 This trend subsided in 1999, as the total num-
ber of mergers and acquisitions declined 28% from the previous year, 
1. Bruce Japsen, Another Record Year for Dealmaking: Activity Among Medium-Size 
Companies Fuels Continued Drive Toward Consolidation, MODERN HEALTHCARE, 
Dec. 23, 1996, at 37. 
2. Id. Merger or acquisition activity includes full-asset mergers, acquisitions, 
lease agreements, joint ventures, and partnerships in which control or a 
significant equity stake in a hospital changes hands. See Bruce Japsen, An 
Off Year for Consolidation: '97 Tally Shows Sharp Cutback in Big Corporate Deals, 
MODERN HEALTHCARE, Jan. 12, 1998, at 40. 
3. See Jaspen, An Off Year for Consolidation, supra note 2, at 40. 
4. See Japsen, Another Record Year, supra note 1, at 37. 
5. Japsen, An Off Year for Consolidation, supra note 2, at 40. 
6. JUDITH C. APPELBAUM, NATIONAL WOMEN'S LAw CENTER, HOSPITAL MERGERS 
AND THE THREAT TO WOMEN'S REPRODUCTrvE HEALTH SERVICES: USING ANTI-
TRUST LAws TO FIGHT BACK 7 (1998). 
7. Id. 
75 
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to 142.8 In addition, the number of hospitals involved dropped 23% 
to 530.9 
Despite the decrease in the number of transactions in 1999, ten very 
large transactions were completed, several of which involved secular 
and non-secular hospitals. Of the ten corporate health care mergers, 
the largest was the merger of Daughters of Charity National Health 
System and Sisters of St. Joseph Health System. lO The merger of these 
two Roman Catholic organizations created Ascension Health, which is 
now comprised of seventy-three hospitals, with more than six billion 
dollars in revenue. II 
Hospital mergers are complicated because such mergers inevitably 
affect a patient's choices and preferences. Patient choice of hospitals 
is determined by many different variables, including: (1) patients who 
want only a particular doctor to perform the necessary services or pro-
cedures;12 (2) others who choose a hospital based on their perception 
of quality;13 and (3) other patients who wish to remain near their 
home and choose a hospital within close proximity.14 Further, the 
patient's managed care organization (MCO), commonly known as the 
insurance company or third-party payor, is an increasingly important 
variable in a patient'S choice of hospital.I 5 MCOs can influence, or 
even change, a patient's behavior.16 
8. Deanna Bellandi, Spinoffs, Big Deals Dominate in '99: Despite Some High-Volume 
Mergers, Total Hospital Transactions Dipped 28% Compared With the Previous 
Year, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Jan. 10, 2000, at 36. The tally includes "merg-
ers, acquisitions, joint ventures, long-term leases and other partnerships in 





12. See Sharla Lichtman, Ontario Doctors Talk Back, FINANCIAL POST, Feb. 21, 
2000, at C07; see also United States v. Mercy Health Services, 902 F. Supp. 
968,973 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (indicating that patients consider many factors 
when deciding where to receive inpatient care). 
13. See Medical Centers oj Excellence: An Idea Ripe Jor Implementation in Today's 
Health Care Industry, HEALTH CARE STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT,Jan. 1,2000, at 
24. See also Mercy, 902 F. Supp. at 973. 
14. See Medical Centers oj Excellence, supra note 13, at 24. See also United States v. 
Rockford Memorial Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1285 (7th Cir. 1990);Jonathan B. 
Baker, The Antitrust Analysis oj Hospital Mergers and the Transformation oj the 
Hospital Industry, 51 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 93, 142-143 (1988). 
15. See Mercy, 902 F. Supp. at 973-974 (indicating that managed care has forced 
individuals to consider the amount of their out-of-pocket expenses). 
16. See id. 
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When two or more hospitals merge, many concerns arise: what hap-
pens to the patient's choice? What does the patient do in an emer-
gency when the doctor of choice no longer has privileges at the 
merged hospital, but does have privileges at a hospital forty miles 
away? What does a patient do when certain services are eliminated as 
a result of the merger or when the patient wishes to remain in a hospi-
tal close to home, but the insurance company steers the patient to a 
hospital thirty miles away because services are less expensive? Further-
more, what happens when there is a merger between the only two 
hospitals in a rural area or when a Catholic and non-Catholic hospital 
merge? 
In a hospital merger case, a governmental agency, either the Fed-
eral Trade Commission (FTC) or the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
(collectively referred to as "the Agencies"), must assess any anti-com-
petitive effects of the merger. I7 In addition, the relevant market, the 
merged parties' relevant share in that market, the market concentra-
tion, and, if applicable, any efficiency rebuttals must be examined. IS 
The issue of patient choice, i.e. consumer choice, can generally be 
addressed in any part of this analysis, however, it is typically over-
looked when hospitals merge. 
Although limited consumer choice may prove to be a fatal factor in 
some merger cases,I9 hospital merger cases have been evaluated dif-
ferently. In a hospital merger case, the consumer choice issue ap-
pears to be overlooked when defining the geographic market, and 
also when the parties prove that substantial efficiencies20 will result 
from the merger.21 
17. See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 1992 HORI. 
ZONTAL MERCER GUIDELINES, 57 Fed. Reg. 41552, 41554 (1992). 
18. See id. 
19. E.g., National Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 
(1978) (stating that agreements limiting consumer choice impede the 
workings of the marketplace); Full Draw Productions v. Easton Sports, Inc., 
182 F.3d 745, 755 (lOth Cir. 1999) (citing limited consumer choice as a 
factor in finding that the defendant's behavior was anticompetitive). But see 
F.T.C. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 248 (1972) (stating that 
while limiting consumer choice is a factor to be considered, it alone would 
not support a finding of unfair trade practice). 
20. See infra Part V.B.2. 
21. See Richard D. Raskin & Bruce M. Zessar, Telling the Efficiencies Stary: Practical 
Lessons from the Hospital Merger Field, 13 ANTITRUST 21, 23 (1999) (stating 
that the FTC has indicated that the ~hospital industry is an area in which 
efficiencies can be of particular significance" as ~[c]ertain characteristics of 
hospitals lend themselves to effective efficiencies cases"). 
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Due to the uniqueness of the hospital market,22 the Agencies often 
misconstrue the geographic market in which hospitals and consumers 
are located.23 This misconstruction, combined with various ways to 
include consumers in the market, draws attention away from con-
sumer choice. Instead of arguing the nuances of the geographic mar-
ket, the Agencies should set a standard definition that focuses on 
maintaining consumer choice. 
Furthermore, the two issues, limited consumer choice and efficien-
cies, can often contradict each other. For example, in order for the 
newly-merged hospital to be more efficient, it may curb or cut some 
services previously available at either one, or both, of the hospitals.24 
Although curbing a service may lead to cost savings, some consumers 
will be unable to obtain a necessary service, or unable to visit the most 
convenient location. 
Consumer choice is especially relevant in mergers involving a Cath-
olic and non-Catholic hospital where reproductive services may be 
curbed or eliminated.25 As hospitals find it increasingly necessary and 
cost-efficient to consolidate,26 the issue of limited consumer choice 
should be placed at the forefront of any agency's analysis. 
Analyses of hospital merger cases tend to focus on the efficiencies 
defense raised by the defendants.27 In other merger cases, this de-
fense is usually unacceptable because efficiencies are difficult to mea-
sure and are even more difficult to prove.28 Surprisingly, in hospital 
merger cases, the courts are often inclined to accept an efficiencies 
defense as an absolute defense, thereby precluding any scrutiny by 
either of the Agencies.29 
22. See William G. Kopit & Tanya B. Vanderbilt, Unique Issues in the Analysis of 
Non-Profit Hospital Mergers, 35 WASHBURN LJ. 254, 254-59 (1996). 
23. See infra Part V.C.l.b. 
24. See Raskin & Zessar, supra note 21, at 23; see also Jonathan Choslovsky, 
Agency Review of Health Care Industry Mergers: Proper Procedure or Unnecessary 
Burden?, 10 ADMIN. LJ. AM. U. 291, 294-295 (Spring 1996); Baker, supra 
note 14, at 99-100. 
25. See Lisa C. Ikemoto, When a Hospital Becomes Catholic, 47 MERCER L. REv. 
1087, 1088 (1996); see also APPLEBAUM, supra note 6, at 9. 
26. See Raskin & Zessar, supra note 21, at 21; see also Choslovsky, supra note 24, 
at 293-94. 
27. See, e.g., United States v. Long Island Jewish Medical Center, 983 F. Supp. 
121 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285 
(W.D. Mich. 1996), afJ'd in unpublished opinion, 121 F.3d 708 (6th Cir. 1997) 
(table). 
28. See FTC v. Staples, 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1089 (D.D.C. 1997). 
29. See Long Island Jewish Medical Center, 983 F. Supp. at 137; Butterworth Health 
Corp., 946 F. Supp. at 1300; see also HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra 
note 17, 57 Fed. Reg. at 41562. 
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In addition, the Agencies, through their guidelines, and the courts, 
through case law, have severely impaired a party's ability to challenge 
a rural hospital merger. The rural exception,30 in large part, is a spin-
off of the efficiencies defense. Currently, this exception, in effect, en-
courages health care monopolies in rural areas. Thus, because mo-
nopolies completely eliminate choice, consumers in rural areas are 
left with no options when hospitals merge. 
As a result of these factors, when the Agencies challenge a merger, 
consumers get lost amid a mass of definitions and speculations. For 
example, consumers are repeatedly lost in battles over what consti-
tutes a geographic market and in the guesses that comprise the effi-
ciencies defense. Though patients are the group most affected by a 
merger, patients are a secondary consideration for decision-makers 
who evaluate the effects of the merger. Consumers and their choice, 
however, should be at the forefront of all merger analyses. Through a 
careful look at case history, the governmental agencies challenging 
mergers should be able to create a case that focuses on, and ultimately 
protects, consumers. 
Section II of this Comment provides a general discussion and back-
ground of the health care industry and gives a brief overview of hospi-
tal mergers.31 Section III discusses the antitrust environment as it 
relates to the health care industry.32 In Section IV, this Comment dis-
cusses horizontal merger regulations as promulgated by the Agen-
cies.33 Section V examines merger analysis under the Clayton Act.34 
Section VI explains the exception allowing rural hospitals to merge, 
despite the consumer choice consequences, without scrutiny by either 
of the Agencies.35 In Section VII, this Comment briefly describes the 
convergence of the Clayton and Sherman Acts, and provides an analy-
sis of merger cases under the Sherman Act.36 Finally, the conclusion 
in Section VIII discusses how the Agencies can and should advocate 
consumer choice.37 
30. See infra Part VI. 
3l. See discussion infra Part II. 
32. See discussion infra Part III. 
33. See discussion infra Part IV. 
34. See discussion infra Part V. 
35. See discussion infra Part VI. 
36. See discussion infra Part VII. 
37. See discussion infra Part VIII. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Evolution of the Health Care Industry Encouraged Mergers, Eviscer-
ating Patient Choice 
Since the 1980s, the health care industry experienced dramatic 
changes. Most notably, changes occurred in the regulatory environ-
ment, which affected hospital merger analysis.38 Regulatory changes 
were a result of cost escalation, changes in insurance, changes in hos-
pital reimbursement and patient lack of information.39 These regula-
tory changes resulted in increased hospital merger and acquisition 
activity during the early 1980s.40 
The changes in the health care field began with insurance and hos-
pital reimbursement under the Medicare and Medicaid programs. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, hospitals had very little incentive to mini-
mize costs or compete on cost-basis because health care insurance in-
corporated retrospective cost-based or charge-based reimbursementY 
This prepaid health insurance led to both an over-utilization of health 
care services provided by hospitals and physicians and to increased 
health care prices.42 
The patients' lack of information exacerbated the inefficient high 
costs and over-utilization associated with the provision of health care 
services.43 Doctors decided the amount of care needed, where that 
care would be administered, and then administered the necessary 
care.44 Given that physician compensation was related to the level 
and amount of care selected for a patient, the cost-based reimburse-
ment system encouraged overuse of services and extended lengths of 
stays. Thus, the cost of health care rose to inefficient levels.45 
Health care cost escalation was also a result of the regulatory 
scheme established in the 1960s.46 Continued increases in cost, in 
38. Baker, supra note 14, at 94. The "regulatory environment" in the health 
care industry takes into consideration patients, hospitals, doctors, and in-
surance companies. 
39. See infra notes 41-63 and accompanying text. 
40. Baker, supra note 14, at 94. 
41. [d. at 95. Cost-based reimbursement was a fee-for-seIVice concept, whereby 
Medicare or Medicaid reimbursed hospitals based on the institution's 
charges for all services rendered. SeeJosEPH SNOE, AMERICAN HEALTH CARE 
DELIVERY SYSTEMS 620 (West Group 1998). 
42. Baker, supra note 14, at 95. 
43. See id. 
44. [d. 
45. See id. 
46. [d. at 96. Under cost-based reimbursement, patients were entitled to full 
reimbursement for medical care with the exception of opportunity costs, 
which included travel and time away from work or leisure. [d. 
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part due to Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement, prompted Con-
gress to address the issue. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Congress 
enacted the main elements of the health care regulatory scheme.47 
Congress limited the quantity of heath care provided to consumers 
in order to control increasing costs.48 State regulatory boards were 
created to supervise large hospital capital expenditures through the 
use of Certificate of Need ("CON") applications.49 Congress also cre-
ated peer review programs to monitor and limit physician choice of 
care to further decrease costs. 50 These changes were cumbersome to 
most states, and did not effectively control spiraling health care costs. 
The Prospective Payment System ("PPS"), introduced in 1983 and 
in effect today, replaced the 1970s monitoring system. Under the 
PPS, Medicare and Medicaid provide a standardized payment, based 
on a predetermined formula, to every hospital for each patient with a 
given diagnosis.51 This cap, or standardized payment, guarantees that 
every hospital will recover the average cost of treating each patient. 52 
Since a hospital will only receive a fixed cost, a longer length of stay 
causes a hospital to lose money. Conversely, providing minimal ser-
vices to a patient in a shorter time frame (known as under-utilization) 
allows the hospital to profit from the fixed payment.53 As a result, 
hospitals must lower treatment costs or shorten lengths of stay in or-
der to increase profits. 54 Thus, the current payment system encour-
ages hospitals to contain costs. 
47. Id; see also National Health Planning and Development Act, Pub. L. No. 93-
641 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300k (repealed 1986». This Act, inter alia, 
subjected large hospital expenditures to the supervision of regulatory 
boards through the requirement of a Certificate of Need in order to add 
services, facilities, or beds. See infra note 49 for a brief discussion of Certifi-
cate of Need. 
48. Baker, supra note 14, at 96. 
49. Id. Essentially, CONs are entry barriers. See FTC v. University Health, Inc., 
938 F.2d 1206, 1219 (11th Cir. 1991). In order to build a new facility, add a 
service, add beds, or open a new hospital, the state must approve the addi-
tion or change through the CON process. CON attempts to coordinate the 
development of new health care facilities by preventing unnecessary health 
care costs. Id. CON laws regulate the supply of equipment and facilities 
because normal market forces of supply and demand are thought not to 
work in the health care market. See SNOE, supra note 41, at 308. 
50. Baker, supra note 14, at 97. 
51. Id. The standardized payment is based on the average costs associated with 
the treatment of the patient's diagnostic related group (DRG). Id. 
52. Id. 
53. See SNOE, supra note 41, at 621. 
54. See Baker, supra note 14, at 98. 
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The overall result of these changes to the regulatory environment 
increased competition among hospitals. 55 This increased competition 
led to a variety of alternatives within the structure of the health care 
industry. 56 For example, the rapid growth of multi-hospital systems 
may be a direct result of the cost-cutting pressures created by the 
evolving regulatory environment. 57 In addition, peripheral centers 
have entered the market as competition for hospitals.58 Due to tech-
nology advancements, alternative providers, such as outpatient treat-
ment centers, now provide some treatment that was previously only 
available on an inpatient basis. 59 As a result, the demand for inpatient 
treatment has declined and hospitals are left to administer, strictly on 
an inpatient basis, the most expensive, technologically dependent, 
and complex forms of services.60 
Given the current reimbursement system, PPS, hospitals continue 
to lose profits. Many hospitals now find a merger the most attractive 
alternative in order to curb costs and profit losses.61 Ultimately, this 
changing environment may have induced the wave of hospital merg-
ers and acquisitions that require antitrust analysis.62 These changes 
have set the stage for an increasing number of acquisitions and merg-
ers in a struggle to survive the financial constraints of the current 
health care system.63 
B. What Happens When Hospitals Merge? 
l. The Negative Effect on Consumers 
When hospitals merge, a major consolidation of facilities and ser-
vices usually takes place.64 For example, if both hospitals have excess 
55. See id. 
56. See id. at 99. 
57. [d. at 99-100. Hospitals often form large systems to adjust to managed care 
costs, enhance purchasing power, and acquire capital for increased borrow-
ing power. See SNOE, supra note 41, at 818; see also Choslovsky, supra note 
24, at 292. 
58. Choslovsky, supra note 24, at 293-94. Peripheral centers include outpatient 
treatment centers owned by managed care organizations or physician 
groups. [d. 
59. [d. at 293. For example, many surgeries such as orthoscopic knee opera-
tions, typically an inpatient procedure, are now performed in an outpatient 
treatment facility. 
60. [d. at 294. 
61. See SNOE, supra note 41, at 813. 
62. See Baker, supra note 14, at 100. 
63. See Choslovsky, supra note 24, at 298. 
64. Consolidation of services and facilities can include the following: laboratory 
services can be combined at one facility in order to eliminate duplicative 
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bed capacity, all general acute-care services may be moved to one facil-
ity, using the other facility for different services, or closing it alto-
gether. If state and CON65 laws permit, the second facility may 
become a different health care institution, such as a skilled nursing 
facility. The most common result is that one hospital is closed and all 
services are consolidated into the remaining hospital. 
The ultimate result of consolidation is that patients lose their ability 
to choose a hospital or doctor. For example, the hospital nearest to a 
patient's home may have closed, while the newly-merged facility is lo-
cated thirty miles away. The patient's doctor may not have been 
granted privileges at the merged hospital, thereby forcing the patient 
to find a new doctor or to travel to the hospital where the doctor has 
privileges. 
2. Catholic and Non-Catholic Hospital Mergers-the Detrimental 
Impact on Consumers 
Although the merger of a Catholic and non-Catholic hospital will 
have the same results as described above, these mergers have the addi-
tional burden of creating compromises on the issue of reproductive 
services. Most Catholic hospitals follow the "Ethical and Religious Di-
rectives for Catholic Health Care Services" ("Directives"). 66 These Di-
rectives require Catholic facilities, and professionals practicing in 
those facilities, to adopt and adhere to them as a condition of medical 
privilege and employment.67 The practical effect of the Directives is 
limiting services in accordance with the beliefs of the Catholic faith. 
testing facilities; various medical units can be consolidated, which results in 
a significant reduction in staff members; the dietary department of both 
hospitals can be consolidated using one central food production facility; 
purchasing and management can be consolidated and achieve a reduction 
in personnel through negotiating volume discounts with vendors that the 
hospitals could not obtain separately; laundry services can be consolidated 
so that one hospital can process both hospitals' linens; management infor-
mation services personnel can be reduced; computer services can be con-
solidated to one operating system; administration can be consolidated to 
one umbrella for both hospitals or the one remaining hospital, depending 
on the circumstances of the merger; and technical services, such as obstet-
rics or cardiology, may be consolidated at the most advanced facility, or the 
facility where the service is currently in place. See Raskin & Zessar, supra 
note 21, at 22. 
65. See supra note 49 and infra notes 258-59 for a discussion of CON. 
66. See APPELBAUM, supra note 6, at 7-8. The Directives "provide 'authoritative 
guidance' to Catholic health care institutions and professionals on stan-
dards of behavior that flow from church doctrine." Id. at 7. 
67. Id. at 7-8. 
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For example, the Directives prohibit abortion, contraceptive services 
or counseling, sterilization procedures, and infertility treatments.68 
Thus, if a Catholic hospital and non-Catholic hospital merge, the ef-
fect on services available can be even greater than that of a merger 
between two secular hospitals. 
In a merger involving a Catholic hospital and a non-Catholic hospi-
tal, the secular hospital may be required to abide by the Directives.69 
As a result, services such as abortion, surgical sterilization, tubal liga-
tion, and distribution of the "morning-after" pill for rape victims may 
be eliminated.70 Consequently, patients seeking these services may be 
unduly burdened with excess costs and travel time to facilities that will 
provide the necessary service. 
III. THE ANTITRUST ENVIRONMENT SURROUNDING THE 
HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY 
A. Evolution of Antitrust Regulation Envelops the Health Care Industry and 
its Consumers 
While the health care industry, particularly in the 1980s, exper-
ienced some dramatic changes, the legal environment also exper-
ienced some changes making antitrust principles more applicable to 
the health care industry.71 First, the Supreme Court, in Goldfarb v. 
Virginia State Bar,72 held that antitrust principles embodied in the 
Sherman Act apply to the activities of "learned professionals."73 Thus, 
doctors, their practices, and the hospitals in which they worked, were 
no longer exempt from antitrust law. 
Second, in Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital,74 the Su-
preme Court held that a restraint on competition, even in a local hos-
pital market, can "substantially and adversely affect interstate 
commerce."75 Therefore, hospitals were subject not only to the Com-
68. Id. at 8. 
69. Id. at 7-8. This can often be the breaking point for a secular/non-secular 
merger, where some merger negotiations have broken down over the Cath-
olic hospital'S staunch stand on the Directives. 
70. Id. at 8. 
71. See Baker, supra note 14, at 106. 
72. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). 
73. Id. at 787 (indicating that the nature of an occupation or profession does 
not provide "sanctuary" from the antitrust laws). 
74. 425 U.S. 738 (1976). 
75. Id. at 743 (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 195 
(1974)). In this case, "the restraint allegedly affected the interstate flow of 
a hospital'S medicine and supplies, third-party payment and management 
fees .... " John J. Miles & Mary Susan Philp, Symposium: Current Developments 
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merce Clause, but also to the government's jurisdiction under the an-
titrust laws. 
Finally, in National Gerimedical Hospital and Gerontology Center v. Blue 
Cross of Kansas City,'6 the Supreme Court held that the National 
Health Planning and Resources Development Act77 does not provide 
blanket immunity to activities that arguably fall under the rubric of 
health planning.78 The repeal of the Act left states with the option to 
regulate their respective health care industries.79 A state's authority to 
approve a CON for a hospital merger does not, however, immunize 
the merger from judicial review under the applicable antitrust laws.80 
As a result of these decisions, the FTC and DO] became increasingly 
interested in antitrust enforcement in the health care industry.81 
B. Congressional Action to Protect Consumers in this Merger Market 
Congress sought a way to protect consumers and small businesses 
from the anticompetitive effects of mergers.82 In 1914, Congress 
passed the Clayton Act83 to prevent economic concentration and to 
protect interstate commerce.84 This Act prohibited persons engaged 
in, or affecting, interstate commerce from acquiring "stock or other 
share capital" of another.85 
Under this Act, corporations were able to avoid scrutiny by acquir-
ing non-stock assets.86 This change reflected congressional concern 
that the economy had become too concentrated in the hands of a few 
large companies,87 and sought to limit increases in economic concen-
in Health Law; Hospitals Caught in the Antitrust Net: An Overoiew, 24 DUQ. L. 
REv. 489, 496 (1985). 
76. 452 U.S. 378 (1981). 
77. Pub. L. No. 93-641 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300k (repealed 1986». See 
sUfrra note 47 and accompanying text for a brief description of this Act. 
78. See National Gerimedical Hasp., 452 U.S. at 393 (indicating that the Act is not 
so incompatible with antitrust laws so as to create a .. 'pervasive' repeal of 
the antitrust laws as applied to every action taken in response to the health-
care planning process"). 
79. See Baker, sUfrra note 14, at 107. 
80. See id. 
81. See Miles & Philp, sUfrra note 75, at 496. 
82. See S. Rep. No. 81-1775, at 2-3 (1950), reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N., for a 
discussion of the legislative history of the Sherman Act. 
83. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 12-19, 21-27(West 1997). 
84. See generally United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 275 (1966); 
Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358, 365 (9th Cir. 1955). 
85. 15 U.S.C.A. § 18 (West 1997). 
86. S. REp. No. 81-1775, at 2. 
87. See id. at 3. 
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tration that resulted from corporate mergers.88 Congress later 
amended the Clayton Act by passing the Celler-Kefauver Act,89 which 
afforded further protection for consumers by eliminating a corpora-
tion's ability to acquire the assets of another corporation.90 The Cel-
ler-Kefauver Act sought to prevent those acts, which would tend to 
lessen competition at their incipiency.91 
IV. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND FEDERAL TRADE COMMIS-
SION ANTITRUST REGULATION 
A. Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
In 1992, the Agencies issued the Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
("Guidelines").92 The Guidelines describe the Agencies' uniform en-
forcement policy concerning the Sherman Act,93 the Clayton Act,94 
and the Federal Trade Commission Act,95 and outlines a five-step 
methodology for analyzing mergers under the Clayton Act.96 
The first step in the analysis is to decide whether the firm exceeded 
its lawfully permissible market power; the greater the market concen-
tration, the greater market power a firm can exert.97 To analyze this 
relationship, the market power98 is defined first, then the market con-
centration is determined. Next, the Agencies must ascertain the prod-
uct market, which is the market where: (1) the same products or 
services are sold by competitive firms; (2) close substitutes exist; or 
(3) other firms can produce or sell the same products or services with 
little effort.99 
88. See id. 
89. Ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950) (codified in 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 18, 21 (West 
1997)) . 
90. See S. REP. No. 81-1775, at 2. 
91. See id. at 4. See generally Transamerica Corp. v. Board of Governors of Fed-
eral Reserve System, 206 F.2d 163, 166 (3rd Cir. 1953). 
92. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 17, 57 Fed. Reg. 41552. 
93. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-7 (West 1997). 
94. Id. §§ 12-19, 21-27 (as amended by Celler-Kefauver Act of Dec. 29, 1950, 15 
U.S.C.A. §§ 18,21 (West 1997)). 
95. Id. §§ 41-77. 
96. 57 Fed. Reg. at 41553 (1992). 
97. Id. § 1.0. 
98. Market power is defined as the ability of a seller to maintain prices above 
the competitive level for a significant period of time, or to depress prices 
below the competitive price level. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra 
note 17,57 Fed. Reg. at 41553. The result of exercise of market power is a 
transfer of wealth from buyers to sellers. See id. 
99. Id. § 1.11. 
2000] Hospital Mergers Versus Consumers 87 
The second step in the analysis is to examine the market shares 
held by the participants, in the markets just defined,lOo according to 
the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index ("HHI") .101 Both the post-merger 
HHI and the HHI change from pre-merger to post-merger are 
analyzed. 102 
In the third step, ease of entry into the market is reviewed. 103 If 
other firms can easily enter the market in a timely fashion and with 
significant force, then they could deter the anticompetitive effects of 
high market concentration and the increased market power of the 
merging firms. 104 
Step four affords the merging firms the opportunity to demonstrate 
significant efficiencies as a result of the merger. If efficiencies could 
be achieved by means other than a merger, the Agencies will reject 
those efficiencies.105 If not, then the Agencies will not challenge that 
merger.106 
The final step in the analysis is for the Agencies to consider, first, 
whether one of the merging firms will fail absent the merger, and 
second, whether that firm's assets will exit the relevant market. 107 To 
determine whether the firm will fail, the Agencies will closely assess 
whether the "failing firm" has explored all possible alternatives to 
merger or acquisition.108 If the merger will not enhance the market 
power of the merging firms, the Agencies will not challenge the 
merger. 109 
B. Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care 
In 1993, the Agencies issued the "Statements of Antitrust Enforce-
ment Policy in Health Care" ("Statements") .110 The Agencies subse-
100. Id. 
101. Id. § 1.5. The Agencies generally characterize market concentration as un-
concentrated (less than 1,000), moderately concentrated (between 1,000 
and 1,800), and highly concentrated (greater than 1,800). Id. 
102. Id. § 1.51. In a highly concentrated market (HHI greater than 1,800), an 
increase of over fifty points will raise concern, and an increase over 100 will 
create a presumption of market power. Id. § LSI (c). 
103. Id. § 3.0. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. § 4.0 (1997). 
106. Id. 
107. Id. § 5.0. 
108. Id. § 5.l. 
109. Id. § 5.0. 
110. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND FEDERAL TRADE COMM1SSION, STATEMENTS OF 
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTHCARE (1993). 
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quently revised the Statements in 1994 and 1996.111 The 1996 
Statements reflect the goal of "ensur[ing] a competitive marketplace 
in which consumers will have the benefit of high quality, cost-effective 
health care and a wide range of choices .... "112 
To effectuate this goal, Statement 1, entitled "Merger Among Hos-
pitals," creates an antitrust safety zone and describes the analysis of 
mergers among hospitals that fall outside of this zone. 113 A merger 
falling within the antitrust safety zone will not be challenged. For ex-
ample, if two general acute-care hospitals merge where one hospital 
has: (1) an average of fewer than 100 licensed beds over the three 
most recent years; and (2) an average daily inpatient census of fewer 
than forty patients over the three most recent years,114 then the Agen-
cies will not challenge the hospital merger. 
The Agencies follow the procedures set forth in the Guidelines to 
analyze mergers that fall outside of the antitrust safety zone. If the 
analysis reveals that the merger will not result in a substantial lessen-
ing of competition, the Agencies will not challenge the merger. 115 Sit-
uations precluding a challenge include transactions where: (1) the 
merger will not increase market power because of the post-merger 
presence of strong competitors or because the merging hospitals are 
sufficiently differentiated; (2) the merged hospitals could achieve sav-
ings not otherwise possible; or (3) the merger will eliminate a hospital 
that is likely to fail. 116 
Ill. Id. at 2. 
112. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Introduction to 
Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Healthcare (1996) (herein-
after "1996 STATEMENTS"); see also Richard C. Wade, Hospital Horizontal Merg-
ers and Antitrust, 1997 DET. C.L. REv. 1281, 1291 (1997). The 1996 
Statements contain the following enforcement policies: (1) mergers among 
hospitals; (2) hospital joint ventures involving high technology or other ex-
pensive health care equipment; (3) hospital joint ventures involving spe-
cialized clinical or other expensive health care services; (4) providers' 
collective provision of non-fee-related information to purchasers of health 
care services; (5) providers' collective provision of fee-related information 
to purchasers of health care services; (6) provider participation in ex-
changes of price and cost information; (7) joint purchasing arrangements 
among health care providers; (8) physician network joint ventures; and (9) 
multiprovider networks. See 1996 STATEMENTS. This comment will only fo-
cus on Statement 1: Mergers Among Hospitals. 
113. 1996 STATEMENTS, supra note 112, at Statement 1, Introduction. 
114. Id. at Statement 1, § A. 
115. Id. at Statement 1, § B. See also supra notes 92-109 and accompanying text 
for a description of the five-step methodology used to analyze mergers. 
116. See 1996 STATEMENTS, supra note 112, at Statement 1, § B. 
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Hospitals that are considering mergers can seek preliminary review 
under the DOl's business review procedure117 or the FTC's advisory 
opinion procedure118 for a determination of the Agencies' probability 
of challenging the merger. 119 
V. THE CLAYTON ACT ENSURES CONSUMER CHOICE WHEN 
HOSPITALS MERGE 
If a hospital merger is questioned as a result of limiting consumer 
choice, the Agencies have several cases for guidance.12o These cases 
strongly support an argument to block a hospital merger that would 
limit consumer choice and, in effect, undermine the Agencies' goal of 
"ensur[ing] a wide range of choices."121 
A. Maximization of Consumer Choice and the Clayton Act 
The Clayton Act,122 enacted in 1914,123 and amended by the Celler-
Kefauver Act124 in 1950,125 prohibits one company from acquiring 
part or all of the assets, stock, or other capital of a competitor where 
the effect of such action may substantially lessen competition or create 
a monopoly.126 Hospital mergers, involving the acquisition of one 
company's assets by another, are generally analyzed under this act.127 
117. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.6 (1999). 
118. See 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-1.4 (2000). 
119. See 1996 STATEMENTS, supra note 112, at Statement 1, § B. 
120. See infra Part V.A. 
121. 1996 STATEMENTS, supra note 114, at Introduction. 
122. 15 U.S.CA §§ 12, 13, 14-19,21,22-27 (West 1997). 
123. 15 U.S.CA § 12 (West 1997). 
124. Ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950) (codified as 15 U.S.CA §§ 18, 21 (West 
1997) ). 
125. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Celler-
Kefauver Act. 
126. 15 U.S.CA § 18 (West 1997). The Clayton Act provides in pertinent part: 
Id. 
No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting com-
merce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of 
the stock or other share capital and no person subject to the juris-
diction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole 
or any part of the assets of another person engaged also in com-
merce or in any activity affecting commerce, where in any line of 
commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of 
the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to 
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly. 
127. See generally United States v. Long IslandJewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121 
(E.D.N.Y. 1997). 
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When assessing a merger under section 7 of the Clayton Act, the 
test of a competitive market is "not only whether small companies 
flourish but also whether consumers are well served."128 This test was 
articulated and subsequently applied in United States v. Tidewater 
Marine Service, Inc. 129 
Tidewater Marine is important because it recognizes the impact on 
customers in issues surrounding mergers. 130 While the focus of hospi-
tal mergers may also be the customer, those customers are distinguish-
able from the consumers in Tidewater Marine. Consumers in hospital 
merger cases are patients who are not able to simply switch services or 
perform the services on their own, given the specialized services they 
seek. In a hospital merger case, the uniqueness of consumers and 
their lack of bargaining power pose a significant threat to the patient's 
ability to choose. Thus, the Agencies should challenge hospital merg-
ers that limit, or have the potential to limit, consumer choice. 
In order to challenge such a merger, the FfC must first establish 
that it has jurisdiction over the merger and the parties. 131 Once the 
jurisdictional requirement is satisfied, the FfC analyzes the merger 
for anticompetitive effects, the relevant market, market concentra-
tion, ease of entry, and potential defenses such as efficiencies or fail-
ing company.132 
128. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 367 n.43 (1963). 
Section 7's fundamental purpose is to "arrest the trend toward concentra-
tion ... before the consumer's alternatives disappeared through merger." 
[d. at 367; see also United States v. Tidewater Marine Serv., Inc., 284 F. Supp. 
324, 338 (E.D. La. 1968) (citing United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 
168 F. Supp. 576, 588 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (stating that when measuring the 
anticompetitive effect of a merger, "we must examine its effect on the com-
petitors as well as the customers of the merged companies")). 
129. 284 F. Supp. 324 (E.D. La. 1968). There, the court determined that the 
customers were not harmed by the merger of companies that supplied 
boats for transporting supplies and equipment to offshore drilling sites. [d. 
at 340. The companies that supplied the boats were much smaller than the 
oil companies that required the boats. [d. Therefore, the boat suppliers 
had to remain subservient to the needs of their customers. [d. The large 
oil companies could, if necessary, own and operate their own supply boats if 
they became dissatisfied with the price or service of the charter boats. [d. 
130. See id. at 338-340. 
131. See, e.g., United States v. Rockford Mem'l Corp., 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 
1990). 
132. 57 Fed. Reg. 41553, 41554 (1992). 
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B. FTC Jurisdiction 
The Clayton Act authorizes FTC jurisdiction over corporate acquisi-
tions where the parties are engaged in commerce or in any activity 
affecting commerce.133 Hospitals engage in, or affect, interstate com-
merce by contracting with MCOs, treating patients who live in other 
states, contracting with pharmaceutical companies to buy drugs, or 
paying management fees. 134 Hospitals involved in mergers thus fall 
under the FTC's jurisdiction. 135 
Jurisdiction over for-profit hospitals has not been an issue because 
they have assets. However, a question eventually arose about the juris-
dictional status of non-profit hospitals. Non-profit organizations do 
not have stock or assets. The Clayton Act, as amended by the Celler-
Kefauver Act, prohibits the acquisition of stock or other assets in a 
merger that would limit competition.136 Thus, the FTC's jurisdiction 
over non-profit organizations was questioned. 
In dicta, the court in United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp.137 stated 
that the FTC had jurisdiction over non-profit hospitals.13s In that 
case, the DOJ brought suit under section 7 of the Clayton Act139 and 
section 1 of the Sherman Act140 to e~oin the merger of the two larg-
est non-profit hospitals in Rockford, Illinois. 141 The lower court held 
that the merger violated section 7 of the Clayton Act, but did not ad-
dress the Sherman Act charge.142 The hospitals appealed, arguing 
that the Clayton Act did not apply to a merger between non-profit 
entities.143 
133. 15 U.S.C.A. § 18 c. 
134. See, e.g., Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738 (1976). 
135. See FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d 260, 266 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing FTC v. 
University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206 (lIth Cir. 1991»; United States v. 
Rockford Mem'l Corp., 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1990». 
136. 15 U.S.CA § 18 (West 1997). 
137. 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1990). 
138. [d. at 1281. 
139. Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits asset-acquisition mergers that lessen 
competition. 15 U.S.CA § 18 (West 1997). 
140. Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits mergers if they restrain trade. 15 
U.S.CA § 1 (West 1997). 
141. Rockford, 898 F.2d at 1281. 
142. [d. at 1280. 
143. [d. As noted above, the Clayton Act prohibits asset-acquisition mergers. See 
supra note 139. The hospitals, as non-profit entities, argued that, by defini-
tion, they did not have "assets." Rockford, 898 F.2d at 1280. 
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Section 11 of the Clayton Ace44 gives authority to five agencies to 
enforce the Clayton Act; one of these agencies being the FfC. 145 As 
such, the court determined that the asset-acquisition provision of sec-
tion 7 of the Clayton Act exempted only those mergers in regulated 
industries enumerated in section 11,146 of which the hospital industry 
was not included. 147 Ultimately, the court held that the merger was 
not subject to section 7 of the Clayton Act because the non-profit hos-
pitals did not have assets in the form of stock or share capital. 148 
Nonetheless, the court held that the merger was a violation of the 
Sherman Act. 149 
Although not raised by the DOl, the court determined, in dicta, 
that the merger was subject to section 7 of the Clayton Act. 150 The 
144. 15 U.S.C.A. § 21 (West 1997). 
145. lWckford, 898 F.2d at 1280. At the time ofthis case, 15 U.S.C.A. § 21 stated, 
in relevant part: "'Authority to enforce compliance with sections 2, 3, 7, 
and 8 of this Act by the persons respectively subject thereto is hereby vested 
in ... the Federal Trade Commission where applicable to all other charac-
ter of commerce.'" [d. (quoting 15 U.S.C.A. § 21). However, the substance 
remains the same: "Authority to enforce compliance with sections 13, 14, 
18, and 19 of this title by the persons respectively subject thereto is vested 
in ... the Federal Trade Commission where applicable to all other charac-
ter of commerce." [d. See also 15 U.S.C.A. § 21 (a) (West 1997). 
146. lWckford, 898 F.2d at 1280. The regulated industries not subject to FTC 
jurisdiction include: common carriers (as regulated by the Interstate Com-
merce Commission, the Federal Communications Commission and the 
Civil Aeronautics Board), and banks (as regulated by the Federal Reserve 
Board) . See id. 
147. lWckford, 898 F.2d at 1280. 
148. [d. at 1281 (concluding that "as the parties have framed the issues the merger is 
not subject to section 7"). The court, although believing the merger was 
subject to the Clayton Act, declined to extend its interpretative powers. [d. 
149. [d. at 1281 (affirming on alternative grounds and determining that al-
though the district court judge did not reach a conclusion on the Sherman 
Act, it could do so since the findings demonstrate a violation of section 1). 
The court doubted whether there was a substantive difference between the 
standard for judging a merger under section 1 of the Sherman Act and the 
standard for judging the same merger under section 7 of the Clayton Act. 
See id. at 1282. If a transaction restrains trade, it violates section 1. [d. If the 
effect of the transaction substantially lessens competition, it violates section 
7. [d. The court went on further to say that the judicial interpretations of 
the two acts have converged. [d. (citing 2 Areeda & Turner, Antitrust Law, 
11 304 (1978); 4 Areeda & Turner, Antitrust Law, 11 906); see also Miles & 
Philp, supra note 75, at 665 (noting that leading commentators suggest 
there is little difference between section 1 of the Sherman Act and section 7 
of the Clayton Act); see infra notes 375-81 and accompanying text. 
150. lWckford, 898 F.2d at 1281. 
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court said that the reference in the Clayton Act to the jurisdiction of 
the FTC should refer to section 11 of that Act, and not section 4 of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act (the "FTC Act"}.151 
Later, the court in FTC v. University Health, Inc.,152 conclusively de-
termined that non-profit hospitals are subject to the FTC's jurisdic-
tion. 153 The court determined that the Clayton Act's reference in 
section 7 to the '~urisdiction of the [FTC]" referred to the limitation 
set forth in that same act, not to the FTC Act. 154 
The University Health court also looked at Congress' intent when cre-
ating the Clayton Act. First, Congress did not provide an explicit ex-
emption to non-profit hospitals for asset acquisitions in section 7. 155 
Second, the court concluded that section 11 is evidence of Congress' 
intent to exempt only certain entities regulated by other governmen-
tal agencies from the FTC's enforcement of section 7.156 Congress 
specifically exempted certain transactions governed by other federal 
agencies, but it declined to limit the FTC's jurisdiction in enforcing 
the Clayton Act to the jurisdiction set forth in the FTC Act. 157 There-
fore, all other entities, including non-profits, are subject to FTC 
jurisdiction. 158 
As a result of this case, although many hospitals and other entities 
are non-profit, the FTC can exercise jurisdiction over them in accor-
dance with the asset-acquisition provision contained in section 7 of 
the Clayton Act.159 The FTC cannot, however, challenge a merger 
under the FTC Act where one party is non-profit because the FTC Act 
only applies to for-profit businesses.16o Despite the fact that the FTC 
Act is the fundamental charter for the FTC,161 the Clayton Act pro-
151. Id. Section 4 of the FTC Act declares that unfair methods of competition 
are illegal. 15 V.S.CA § 45(a)(l) (West 1997). It empowers and directs 
the FTC to "prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations ... from using 
unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or de-
ceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce." 15 V.S.C.A. § 45(a)(2). 
152. 938 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1991). 
153. Id. at 1215. 
154. Id. The FTC Act gives the FTC jurisdiction over corporations, defined as 
any entity designed to carry on business "for its own profit or that of its 
members." Id. at 1214. 
155. Id. at 1214-15. 
156. Id. at 1215. See also supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text for further 
discussion of section 11. 
157. University Heath, Inc., 938 F.2d at 1216-17. 
158. Id. at 1215. 
159. See Baker, supra note 14, at 112. 
160. See id. 
161. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d at 1214. 
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vides an additional independent basis for FTC challenges. 162 There-
fore, non-profit hospitals are subject to FTC jurisdiction under section 
7 of the Clayton Act. 
C. Adverse Competitive Effects 
"The underlying theme of the Guidelines is that mergers should not 
be permitted to create or enhance market power or to facilitate its 
exercise."163 A merger can diminish competition in one of two ways. 
The first is when the merger reduces the total number of firms in a 
market so that the remaining firms are able to collectively exercise 
market power, such as collusion to raise prices.164 The second is 
through unilateral action that prevents consumers from finding sub-
stitutes. 165 In order to establish a prima facie case of an antitrust viola-
tion, the Agencies must determine that the merger will have 
anticompetitive effects, such as, limitation of choice, on consumers.166 
1. Relevant Market 
Determining the relevant market is a necessary predicate to finding 
an antitrust violation,167 because a merger's effect on competition 
cannot be evaluated without a well-defined market.168 The relevant 
market consists of two elements: the product market and the geo-
graphic market. 169 
a. Product Market 
"General acute care inpatient hospital services is a product market 
that has been commonly used to evaluate the competitive effects of 
hospital mergers."170 The FTC characterizes these services as a "com-
162. See Baker, supra note 14, at 112. 
163. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 17, 57 Fed. Reg. at 41553. 
164. See id. at 41558. 
165. See id. at 41560. 
166. See id. at 41553. 
167. See FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d 260, 268 (8th Cir. 1995). 
168. See id. at 268 n.12. 
169. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 17, 57 Fed. Reg. at 41553 
(defining the relevant market as a "group of products and a geographic 
area that is no bigger than necessary to satisfy" the "small but significant 
and non-transitory" increase in price test); see e.g., FTC v. University Health, 
Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 1991); FTC v. Butterworth Health 
Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1290 (W.D. Mich. 1996), affd in unpublished opin-
ion, 121 F.3d 708 (6th Cir. 1997) (table); United States v. Mercy Health 
Services, 902 F. Supp. 968, 976 (N.D. Iowa 1995), vacated 107 F.3d 632 (8th 
Cir. 1997); see also Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d at 268. 
170. Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d at 268. 
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mon host of distinct seIVices and capabilities that are necessary to 
meet the medical, surgical, and other needs of patients, e.g., operat-
ing rooms, anesthesia, intensive care capabilities, 24-hour nursing 
care, lodging, and pharmaceuticals."171 
There are several different levels of care that can also comprise the 
relevant product market, such as primary, secondary, or tertiary care 
seIVices. Primary care seIVices include basic or routine inpatient hos-
pital seIVices available at most general acute-care hospitals, such as 
normal childbirth, general medicine, and general surgeryp2 Secon-
dary care seIVices include certain specialties and more difficult proce-
dures, such as orthopedics, ophthalmology, and cardiac 
catheterization.173 Tertiary care seIVices include the most specialized, 
complex and expensive procedures, such as high-risk obstetric ser-
vices, neonatal care, neurosurgery, heart or orthopedic surgery, ad-
vanced cancer treatment, and burn care.174 
In general, demand substitutability for health care seIVices is very 
limited.175 Patients who need a particular procedure are not able to 
substitute another procedure to cure their problem.176 For example, 
a patient requiring coronary bypass surgery cannot elect a hip replace-
ment to fIx the patient's heart simply because it is less expensive. 177 
Hence, defIning the relevant product market is crucial not only to an 
antitrust analysis, but also to ensuring that consumers have choices 
among health care providers. 
b. Geographic Market 
(1) DefInition 
In accordance with the Guidelines, the Agencies will determine the 
geographic market to be the smallest region in which the monopoly 
would fInd it profItable to impose a "small but signifIcant and non-
transitory increase in price" ("SSNIP") .1'8 The extent to which con-
sumers respond to the SSNIP must be evaluated within the context of 
the geographic market.179 If a fIrm outside the region could prevent 
that price increase, through the exercise of competitive restraint, then 




175. See Baker, supra note 14, at 123. 
176. See id. 
177. See Rnckford, 898 F.2d at 1284. 
178. HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 17, 57 Fed. Reg. at 41556. 
179. [d. at 41554 n.8. 
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the geographic market must be expanded to include that firm.180 If, 
however, a firm outside the region could not prevent that price in-
crease, then the firm is excluded and the initial region alone consti-
tutes the geographic market. 181 Thus, a narrowly defined geographic 
market with a limited number of hospitals could substantially limit 
consumer choice; however, a broadly defined geographic market 
could imply that patients are willing to travel to visit the doctor of 
their choice.182 Therefore, a precise definition is necessary to protect 
consumers. 
(2) Composition of the Geographic Market 
(a) Third-Party Payors 
One aspect of the uniqueness of the hospital market-the heavy 
influence of third-party payors-is particularly relevant when defining 
the geographic market.183 Competition makes it easier for health 
plans, such as health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and pre-
ferred provider networks (PPOs), "to steer their enrollees towards 
those hospitals that offer the most attractive contract terms."184 The 
benefits that the health plan receives are designed to pass to the third-
party payors' consumers, employers, and employees.185 Therefore, 
when determining the geographic market, it is also important to ask 
whether health plans, in the face of a price increase, would steer their 
enrollees to hospitals outside that region so that the monopolist 
would find the price increase unprofitable. 186 
(b) Patients and Patient Flow Data 
The geographic market does not only consider health plans. It also 
consists of patients in the form of patient flow data, showing where 
each discharged patient lives. 187 One variant of patient flow data is 
the Elzinga-Hogarty (E-H) approach, which examines the numbers of 
"import" patients and "export" patients from one region to an-
180. [d. at 41555. 
181. [d. 
182. See infra Part V.C.1.b.(3). 
183. See Gregory S. Vistnes, Defining Geographic Markets for Hospital Mergers, 13 
ANTITRUST 28,28 (1999). Dr. Vistnes was the Deputy Director for Antitrust, 
Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission. 
184. [d. 
185. [d. 
186. See id. 
187. [d. at 31. 
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other. 188 The premise of the E-H approach states that if a few con-
sumers are willing to go to another region, then more consumers will 
cross boundaries in the event of a price increase.189 As applied to 
hospitals, the E-H approach requires a small amount of patient out-
flow and inflow from another region.190 
A variant of the E-H approach is the zip code approach, which in-
volves identifYing the zip codes of where a given percentage of re-
sidents travel to hospitals outside the region for health care 
services. 191 The rationale behind the contestable zip code approach is 
similar to that of the E-H approach-if some patients are willing to 
use outside hospitals, other patients, in contestable zip codes, will also 
use hospitals outside the region, in the event of a price increase.192 
The court in United States v. Mercy Health Services193 used the zip code 
approach to define a very broad geographic market. 194 Mercy Health 
Center and Finley Hospital, the only two general acute-care hospitals 
in Dubuque, Iowa, agreed to merge.195 The DO] asserted that the 
geographic market consisted of a "half-circle with a 15 mile radius" 
that included Mercy, Finley, and one of seven rural hospitals. 196 The 
hospitals contended that the relevant geographic market comprised a 
70 to 100 mile area which included Mercy, Finley, the seven closest 
rural hospitals, and the regional hospitals located in Cedar Rapids, 
Waterloo, Iowa City, Davenport and Madison.197 
The court criticized the DOl's reliance on the E-H test, stating that 
the test is only a starting point that indicates current conditions; it 
does not consider what would happen if one of the market partici-
pants attempted to exercise market power. 198 Considering the de-
188. See id. The E-H approach rests on the notion that there should be few "im-
ports" and few "exports." See id. 
189. See Vistnes, supra note 183, at 28. 
190. See id. 
191. Id. 
192. See id. A contestable zip code is a zip code where residents may choose one 
of several hospitals. The percentage of residents that consistently go to one 
hospital (over another hospital in the area) is low. 
193. 902 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Iowa 1995), vacated 107 F.3d 632 (8th Cir. 1997). 
The case was vacated because the hospitals ultimately decided not to 
merge. 
194. Id. at 979-80. 
195. Id. at 971. 
196. Id. at 976. 
197. Id. 
198. Id. at 978. 
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tailed zip code analysis provided by the hospitals,199 the court 
determined that the government failed to establish a relevant geo-
graphic market. 200 Therefore, it held that the government failed to 
prove that the merger would result in anticompetitive effects.201 
In contrast, the court in United States v. Long Island Jewish Medical 
Center02 discredited patient origin data.203 An expert for the DOJ de-
fined the geographic market as a region approximately five miles 
from the merging hospitals.204 The hospitals, Long Island Jewish 
Medical Center and North Shore Manhasset, defined the geographic 
market according to patient origin data.205 
Rejecting both parties' definitions, the court stated, "[a]s is often 
the case with such complex, fact sensitive issues, the reality lies some-
where between the two versions."206 It further indicated that both the 
DOJ and the hospitals oversimplified the issue, each for their own 
benefit.207 The court concluded that two geographic markets existed: 
the first for primary and secondary care and the second for tertiary 
care.208 
While the E-H and patient inflow data approaches have flaws, agen-
cies and hospitals still use them.209 Despite the relatively high patient 
inflow and outflow in the Long Island Jewish Medical Center and 
North Shore Manhasset merger, the DOl's decision to challenge those 
mergers suggests that the government is giving less weight to patient 
flow analyses.210 Based on the above mentioned holdings, however, 
199. Id. at 979-80 (indicating that hospitals outside the DOl's defined area were 
attracting patients). 
200. Id. at 987 (accepting the hospitals' 70 to 100 mile geographic market 
definition) . 
20l. Mercy, 902 F. Supp. at 987. 
202. 983 F. Supp. 121 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). 
203. Id. at 14l. 
204. Id. at 140. Both hospitals were located on Long Island,just a short distance 
from Manhattan. Id. at 125. 
205. Id. at 141 (showing that the hospitals drew patients from Queens, Nassau, 
and Suffolk, and "that patients residing in these areas seek health care in 
western Suffolk, Nassau, Queens, and Manhattan"). 
206. Id. 
207. Id. 
208. !d. at 141-42. See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text for an expla-
nation of primary, secondary and tertiary care. 
209. See, e.g., United States v. Mercy Health Servs., 902 F. Supp. 968, 978 (N.D. 
Iowa 1995), vacated 107 F.3d 632 (8th Cir. 1997) (noting that the govern-
ment relied too heavily on "past health care conditions" and that the E-H 
test is merely a starting point in determining the actual geographic mar-
ket); Long Island, 983 F. Supp. at 134. 
2lO. See Vistnes, supra note 183, at 33. 
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courts appear willing to accept both approaches or, at least, to con-
sider both approaches.211 Thus, the Agencies should not solely rely 
on patient flow data, but should construct their cases around ensuring 
that consumers have a range of choices in a competitive market. 
(3) Defining the Geographic Market Fails to Protect Consumer 
Choice 
The geographic market in a hospital merger case is not as easily 
defined as the product market. A geographic market can consist of 
several different consumers, namely patients and third-party payors or 
health plans, which could include employers, employees and govern-
ment payors.212 The definition of the geographic market can depend 
on the number of additional hospitals in the area, the availability of 
alternatives, and the definition of consumers.213 In any case, the geo-
graphic market should be based on a variety of information and evi-
dence that is market and fact-specific.214 
Further, patients can be forgotten during the process of defining 
the geographic market.215 Courts do consider patients and third-party 
payors as consumers of hospital services.216 Patients, however, have 
much less leverage with hospitals. Conversely, third-party payors have 
very powerful leverage with hospitals.217 Managed care payors have 
the ability to negotiate contracts for services with hospitals and are 
more concerned with lower prices.218 Some patients may also be con-
211. See, e.g., Mercy, 902 F. Supp. at 977-78 (analyzing, then criticizing the gov-
ernment's use of the E-H test); Long Island, 983 F. Supp. at 134 ("[A]s is 
often the case with such complex, fact sensitive issues, the reality lies some-
where in between the two versions."); see also Vistnes, supra note 183, at 33. 
212. See Long Island, 983 F. Supp. at 134; see also Vistnes, supra note 183, at 33. 
213. See Baker, supra note 14, at 141-43. 
214. See Vistnes, supra note 183, at 33. 
215. See id. at 28 (indicating that "while health plans' enrollees (as well as the 
employers who contract with the health plans) affect how health plans will 
respond to hospital price increases, individual enrollees are generally not 
viewed as the buyer [of health care services] under a Guidelines analysis of 
a hospital merger"). 
216. See Long Island, 983 F. Supp. at 134; see also Vistnes, supra note 183, at 28. 
While Dr. Vistnes indicates that the geographic market definition depends 
on health plans, he also notes that patient flow data is also used in deter-
mining the definition, thereby conceding that patients are also consumers. 
Id. 
217. See Long Island, 983 F. Supp. at 134 (indicating that managed care plans are 
driving hospital decisions on whether to merge, on what services to pro-
vide, and concerning prices). 
218. See United States v. Mercy Health Servs., 902 F. Supp. 968, 973-74 (N.D. 
Iowa 1995), vacated 107 F.3d 632 (8th Cir. 1997) (indicating that MCOs 
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cerned about the escalating costs of health care services, while others 
are more concerned about being able to see the doctor of their 
choice, obtaining the services they desire or need, or going to the 
hospital of their choice.219 
In addition, payors may exacerbate the problems patients experi-
ence. Although payors are supposed to pass benefits onto their con-
sumers, this does not always happen, as payors are very conscious of 
the bottom line.220 Payors are able to direct patients to other facilities 
and physicians,221 even though those facilities and physicians may not 
be the patient's choice. 
For example, a cancer patient's doctor only has privileges at a re-
cently merged hospital, and the payor has a contract with that merged 
hospital, but the hospital has raised its prices. If a patient requires 
chemotherapy, the payor may refuse to pay for the services if those 
services are performed by the doctor of the patient's choice at the 
hospital of the patient's choice. Subsequently, either the patient pays 
for the treatments out of the patient's own pocket, or the patient is 
"steered" by the payor to a different hospital with lower prices.222 
A merger with a broadly defined geographic market will be harder 
to challenge.223 A large market means that a larger number of com-
peting providers are deemed alternative, sufficient substitutes and 
thus can provide similar services.224 This implies that consumers are 
willing to travel long distances to receive the required treatment. 
Therefore, a successful challenge will require evidence indicating that 
patients in need of services will not travel long distances due to the 
costs, or that the nature of the services needed is time-sensitive, or that 
shop on the basis of price and are able to induce hospitals to discount 
charges in return for the payor's promise to direct more patients to the 
hospital, and that MCOs will negotiate the best rates and greatest discounts 
with hospitals). Individual patients clearly do not have this level ofleverage 
with hospitals. 
219. See United States v. Rockford Mem'l Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1285 (7th Cir. 
1990). 
220. See Mercy, 902 F. Supp. at 974. 
221. See Vistnes, supra note 183, at 28. 
222. See generally Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wisc. v. Marshfield Clinic, 
65 F.3d 1406, 14lO, 1412 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting "[g]enerally you must pay 
more for higher quality" and "the HMO's incentive is to keep you healthy if 
it can but if you get very sick, and are unlikely to recover to a healthy state 
involving few medical expenses, to let you die as quickly and cheaply as 
possible"). 
223. See APPELBAUM, supra note 6, at 18. 
224. See id. 
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the patient is unfamiliar with a distant area.225 In sum, the basis for a 
challenge of this nature should be patient choice. 
(4) Market Share, Market Concentration, and Market Power 
When evaluating a merger, the Agencies will calculate market 
shares for all firms in the relevant market.226 The market share of 
each firm is calculated for the firm's future competitive significance.227 
The Agencies will also calculate market concentration, which is a 
function of the number of firms in a relevant market and their respec-
tive market shares.228 The Agencies use the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index ("HHI") to calculate market concentration.229 The spectrum of 
market concentration is divided into three parts: (1) unconcentrated 
if the HHI is below 1,000; (2) moderately concentrated if the HHI is 
between 1,000 and 1,800; and (3) highly concentrated if the HHI is 
above 1,800.230 The Agencies also consider the post-merger market 
concentration and the increase in HHI resulting from the merger. 231 
Mergers resulting in an HHI increase of 100 points or more raise con-
cerns of potential anticompetitive behavior.232 
The merger of two hospitals in a three or four hospital market may 
create a presumption of anticompetitive effects. However, a merger 
does not necessarily have to create market power in order for the FTC 
to look into the legality of the acquisition. One of the most important 
hospital mergers cases analyzed under the Clayton Act, Hospital Corpo-
ration of America v. FTC,233 illustrates this point. 
225. See id. For example, in a Catholic/non-Catholic hospital merger, the Agen-
cies would have to show that patients in need of reproductive health ser-
vices could not, or would not, travel longer distances to obtain these 
services. See id. In addition, the Agencies would have to show that the rea-
son patients could not travel is due to the time-sensitive nature of the ser-
vice needed (Le., the "morning-after" pill or postpartum tubal ligation). See 
id. 
226. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 17, 57 Fed. Reg. at 41557. 
227. ld. Possible indicators include dollar sales, unit sales and physical capacity. 
ld. 
228. ld. 
229. ld. "HHI is calculated by summing the squares of' each participant's mar-
ket share. ld. 
230. ld. 
231. ld. at 41558. The increase in HHI is calculated by multiplying the market 
shares of the merging firms together, then multiplying that number by two. 
ld. at n.l8. 
232. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 17, 57 Fed. Reg. § 1.51. 
233. 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986). 
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Hospital Corporation of America ("HCA") owned one hospital in 
Chattanooga, Tennessee, and through the acquisitions of two health 
care corporations, it acquired two more hospitals.234 In addition, 
HCA assumed contracts to manage two other hospitals in the same 
locale.235 Mter the acquisitions, HCA owned or managed five of 
eleven hospitals in the Chattanooga area. 236 
The FTC challenged the acquisitions under section 7 of the Clayton 
Act. 237 The FTC concluded that the acquisitions could substantially 
lessen competition in the Chattanooga hospital market.238 In addi-
tion, the FTC indicated that hospital mergers would not be analyzed 
differently from mergers involving other industries. 239 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit noted that the decisions in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,240 United 
States v. Aluminum Co. of A merica, 241 United States v. Von's Grocery CO.,242 
and United States v. Pabst Brewing CO.,243 
[s]eemed, taken as a group, to establish the illegality of any 
nontrivial acquisition of a competitor, whether or not the ac-
quisition was likely either to bring about or shore up collu-
sive or oligopoly pricing. The elimination of a significant 
rival was thought by itself to infringe the complex of social 
and economic values conceived by a majority of the Court to 
inform the statutory words "may ... substantially ... lessen 
competition. "244 
In addition, the court noted that all that is necessary to initiate an 
inquiry under section 7 of the Clayton Act is that the merger creates 
an "appreciable danger" of higher prices in the future. 245 
The court also determined that the evidence supported the FTC's 
conclusion that the acquisitions were likely to encourage collusive 
234. Id. at 1383. 
235. Id. at 1383-84. 
236. Id. at 1384. 
237. Id. at 1383. 
238. Id. The acquisitions did not result in a firm of monopoly proportions. See 
Miles & Philp, supra note 75, at 661 (referring to FTC record at 3 TRADE 
REG. REp. (CCH) ~ 22,301 (FTC Oct. 25, 1985». 
239. See Hospital Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1390 (7th Cir. 1986). 
240. 370 u.s. 294 (1962). 
241. 377 u.s. 271 (1964). 
242. 384 U.S. 270 (1966). 
243. 384 U.S. 546 (1966). 
244. Hospital Corp. oj Am., 807 F.2d at 1385. 
245. Hospital Corp. oj Am., 807 F.2d at 1389. 
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practices that would hann consumers.246 The court reached its deci-
sion by validating what the FTC found. 247 First, the market was highly 
concentrated.248 Second, a reduction in the number of competitors 
made it easier for the remaining hospitals to collude or coordinate 
pricing.249 Third, the Chattanooga area hospitals had a documented 
history of collusion.250 Fourth, the hospital market lacked competitive 
alternatives.251 Fifth, the demand for hospital services is inelastic 
under competitive conditions.252 Finally, in order to resist pressure 
from the federal government to cut costs, the hospitals could (and 
did) present a united front,253 even without a monopoly share of the 
market. 
Therefore, a monopoly share of the market is not necessarily a pre-
requisite for the FTC to invalidate a merger. The focus should be on 
the effects the merger has on consumers, given the power hospitals 
have over them.254 As mentioned previously, consumers have very lit-
tle leverage as compared with managed care organizations and third-
party payors to deal with hospitals.255 Philadelphia National Bank and 
246. Id. at 1389. The only question before the court was whether the evidence 
was sufficient to substantiate the FTC's finding. Id. at 1385. It is irrelevant 
that the court may find differently. Id. at 1386. 
247. Id. at 1389. 
248. Id. at 1384 (indicating that HCA's market share rose from 14% to 26% as a 
result of the acquisitions and made it the second largest health care pro-
vider in a market where the four largest firms had 91 % of the market 
share). 
249. Id. at 1387. The court added that the consequence of collusion would be 
the creation of excess capacity because higher prices would cause some pa-
tients to shorten their stay and others to postpone, or even reject, elective 
surgery. Id. 
250. Id. at 1388 (noting that since the hospitals were prone to cooperate, they 
would be prone to collude, and that the management contracts gave HCA 
virtual control over pricing and other decisions). 
251. Id. (suggesting that: (1) going to a nearby city is often out of the question 
in medical emergencies; (2) doctors will not send patients to another city 
where the doctor does not have hospital privileges; and (3) most hospital 
services cannot be provided by non-hospital providers). 
252. Id. (reasoning that people place a high value on their safety, doctors make 
most treatment decisions for their patients, and insurance companies or 
the federal government, not the patient, pay most medical bills). A lower 
elasticity of demand enables providers to make more profits by raising 
prices through collusion. Id. 
253. !d. at 1389 (suggesting that through this form of collusion, hospitals are 
able to frustrate efforts to control hospital costs). 
254. See supra Part II.B.1. 
255. See supra notes 183-86, 220-25 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
heavy influence of third-party payors. 
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Tidewater Marine Services suggest that consumers should be considered 
when testing the competitive market under section 7 of the Clayton 
Act.256 
(5) Entry Barriers in the Hospital Market 
Ease of entry is not usually addressed in hospital merger cases, how-
ever, entry into the hospital market is generally difficult. Entry is 
often controlled by state imposed CON laws.257 In order for a com-
pany to build a new hospital and enter the market, it must go through 
an arduous process, which can take as long as two to three years.258 
The state health facility's regulatory agency must approve the addition 
of any new facility, service, or beds.259 CON laws are essentially state 
imposed entry barriers.26o 
2. Efficiencies Created by a Merger 
a. Efficiencies as Defined by the Agencies 
The Agencies recognize that a merger may create significant effi-
ciencies that permit better utilization of assets and enable the merged 
256. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text. 
257. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. II § 19-123 (1999 and Supp. 2000). 
See supra note 49 and infra notes 258-59 and accompanying text for an 
explanation of CON. 
258. In Maryland, for example, a company wishing to build a new facility would 
first write a letter of intent, which is valid for 180 days. A formal application 
must be filed with the Maryland Health Care Commission (formerly the 
Maryland Health Resources Planning Commission) within this 180 day pe-
riod. The Commission Staff then reviews the application within ten days of 
submission, and may request additional information if necessary. After the 
application is complete and docketed, the applicant has fifteen days from 
receipt of the comments to file a written response. The Commission Staff 
then prepares a recommended decision. Interested parties who previously 
submitted written comments may also submit written exceptions to the pro-
posed decision. The applicant and interested parties have an opportunity 
to present oral arguments on the proposed decision before the full Com-
mission. The Commission must make a final decision on the application 
within 150 days of being docketed. After the administrative review process 
has been exhausted, parties may then seek relief from the courts. See 
COMAR 10.24.01 (1978 and Supp. 1999). 
259. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. II, § 19-103 (2000). In Maryland, the Ma-
ryland Health Care Commission would have to approve the new hospital. 
In addition, the Health Services Cost Review Commission would be in-
volved. Both of these agencies are under the umbrella of the Maryland 
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. 
260. FTC v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1219 (11th Cir. 1991). 
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finn to achieve lower costs.261 If the FTC establishes a prima facie 
case of potential anticompetitive behavior, then the hospitals may 
overcome this presumption by demonstrating that efficiencies, result-
ing from the merger, offset any anticompetitive effects.262 The Agen-
cies, however, will only consider those efficiencies likely to be 
achieved with the merger and unlikely to be achieved without the 
merger.263 
The Guidelines indicate that efficiencies are difficult to verify and 
quantity because only the merging finns possess the infonnation relat-
ing to the efficiencies, and that despite being projected in good faith, 
the efficiencies may not be realized.264 Therefore, the merging finns 
must substantiate their efficiency claims so they can be reasonably ver-
ified by the Agencies.265 
The FTC and DO] will only consider cognizable, merger-specific ef-
ficiencies. 266 These are efficiencies that are of sufficient "character 
and magnitude" to offset any anticompetitive effects of the merger.267 
If they have been verified and do not arise from anticompetitive re-
ductions in service or output, then the Agencies will not challenge the 
merger.268 
The Agencies must detennine whether the efficiencies would re-
verse potential harm to the consumers in the relevant market.269 If 
the potential adverse effects of the merger are great, the cognizable 
efficiencies must be comparable to prevent the merger from being 
anticompetitive.270 
261. See Revision to HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 4, 1997 WL 166999 (Apr. 
8, 1997). Only section 4 was revised in 1997. See id. 
262. See id. 
263. See id. 
264. See id. 
265. See id. Verification of efficiencies by reasonable means involves an assess-
ment of: (1) the likelihood and magnitude of each efficiency; (2) how and 
when each efficiency will be accomplished; (3) how each efficiency will en-
hance the firm's ability to compete; and (4) why each efficiency is merger-
specific. Id.; see also Debra A. Valentine, Address at St. Louis University 
School of Law Conference on Antitrust and Health Care: Current Antitrust 
Issues for the Health Care Provider (Nov. 14, 1997) in 1997 WL 721916 
(F.T.C.). 
266. See MERGER GUIDELINES, 4 Trade Reg. Reps. ~ 13,104 (1992) (with April 8, 
1997 revision to § 4). 
267. Id. 
268. Id. 
269. MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 266, ~ 13,104. 
270. See id. ("The greater the potential adverse competitive effect of a merger ... 
the greater must be cognizable efficiencies in order for the Agency to con-
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Nevertheless, the Agencies do find some efficiencies more accept-
able than others. 271 For example, the Guidelines state that "efficien-
cies resulting from shifting production among facilities formerly 
owned separately, which enable the merging firms to reduce the mar-
ginal cost of production, are more likely to be susceptible to verifica-
tion, merger-specific, and substantial, and are less likely to result from 
anticompetitive reductions in outpUt."272 This explains why efficien-
cies in hospital merger cases are given great deference. In particular, 
the FTC Chairman, Robert Pitofsky, said that the hospital industry is 
an area where efficiencies can be of great significance.273 
b. The Deference Given to the Efficiencies Defense Fails to Protect Consumer 
Choice 
Most courts follow the two-part test established in University Health 
when analyzing an efficiencies defense.274 The merging hospitals 
must prove that: (1) the acquisition will result in significant efficien-
cies; and (2) these efficiencies will be passed on to consumers.275 
Applying the University Health test, the court in FTC v. Butterworth 
Health Corp.,276 denied the FTC's motion for an injunction and al-
lowed Butterworth Health Corporation and Blodgett Memorial Medi-
cal Center to merge.277 The court determined that the relevant 
market, as alleged by the FTC, consisted of general acute-care and 
primary-care inpatient hospital services in the Greater Kent County 
area.278 The court accepted the FTC's market concentration analysis, 
clude that the merger will not have an anticompetitive effect in the relevant 
market."). 
271. See id. 
272. Id. 
273. Raskin & Zessar, supra note 21, at 22. 
274. See FTC v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1223 (11th Cir 1991). 
275. Id. 
276. 946 F. Supp. 1285 (W.D. Mich. 1996), affd in unpublished opinion, 121 F.3d 
708 (6th Cir. 1997) (table). 
277. Id. at 1303. Butterworth and Blodgett were two of four general acute care 
hospitals in Grand Rapids, Michigan. Id. at 1288. Both hospitals were non-
profit and offered comprehensive medical and surgical care, consisting of 
primary, secondary, and tertiary care services. Id. The Hillman Commis-
sion recommended that Blodgett reorganize its existing facilities by consoli-
dating inpatient services with other area hospitals. Id. Subsequently, 
Blodgett and Butterworth initiated discussion and eventually decided to 
merge. !d. The FTC sought an injunction to block the merger under sec-
tion 7 of the Clayton Act. Id. (alleging that the proposed merger would 
substantially lessen competition). 
278. Id. at 1291. "Greater Kent County" included Grand Rapids and the area 
within a thirty mile radius of Grand Rapids; in total, this area contained 
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which indicated that the proposed merger would result in a significant 
increase in the concentration of power in two significant markets.279 
Further, the court concluded that the FTC established a prima facie 
case that the merger would violate section 7.280 
Butterworth and Blodgett used an efficiencies defense to rebut the 
presumption of illegality established by the FTC's prima facie case.281 
Blodgett and Butterworth estimated that their capital expenditures 
would be $187 million and $73.9 million, respectively (for a total of 
$260.9 million), if the merger was blocked, and, collectively, only total 
$161.7 million if the merger was allowed to proceed.282 In addition, 
the hospitals estimated that they would save $68.5 million in operating 
expenditures during the first five years following the merger.283 
Despite the FTC's contention that the hospitals' estimates were 
over-exaggerated, the court, noting that the savings would be passed 
on to consumers, accepted the efficiencies defense.284 In reaching its 
decision, the court also relied on the hospitals' "Community Commit-
ment," in which the hospitals committed to freeze prices, limit mar-
gins, and provide medical services to the underserved and the 
medically needy.285 In addition, the court relied on the hospitals' 
nine hospitals, all of which provided general acute care inpatient services. 
Id. 
279. Id. at 1294. According to this analysis, the hospitals would have a 47 to 67% 
market share of the general acute care inpatient services, and the post-
merger HHI would range from 2,767 to 4,521. Id. (depending on whether 
that market share was measured in terms of licensed beds, discharges, or 
inpatient revenues and indicating an expected increase of between 1,064 
and 1,889 points). Further, a post-merger HHI of greater than 1,800 is con-
sidered to indicate a highly concentrated market. Id. A merger which re-
sults in an increase in the HHI of more than 100 points is considered "likely 
to create or enhance market power or facilitate its exercise." Id. For a 
more detailed discussion of HHI, see supra notes 229-32 and accompanying 
text. The hospitals would also have a 65 to 70% market share of the pri-
mary care inpatient hospital market, and the post-merger HHI would range 
between 4,506 and 5,079. Id. 
280. Id. 
281. Id. at 1300 (noting that evidence of efficiencies benefiting consumers is 
useful in evaluating the merger's overall effect on competition); see also Uni-
versity Health, Inc., 938 F.2d at 1222. 
282. Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1300-01 (indicating a capital expenditure sav-
ings of $99.2 million in the event of the merger). 
283. Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1301. 
284. Id. (indicating that the efficiencies, in the form of capital expenditure 
avoidance and operating efficiencies, would be passed on to consumers, 
given the hospitals' non-profit status and the Community Commitment). 
285. Id. at 1298. 
108 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 30 
non-profit status and gave substantial weight to the evidence, 
presented by the hospitals, indicating that mergers of non-profit hos-
pitals tend to reduce costs.286 
The court went even further to criticize the FTC's analysis of the 
efficiencies defense presented by the hospitals.287 The court con-
cluded that the FTC failed to show that the hospitals would exercise 
their market power to the detriment of consumers,288 and that the 
public interest was best served by allowing the hospitals to merge.289 
Similarly, the defendants in United States v. Long Island Jewish Medical 
Center,290 successfully asserted the efficiencies defense to defeat the 
federal government's claim of an illegal merger. Long Island Jewish 
Medical Center and North Shore Health Systems decided to merge.291 
Both hospitals, located only two miles apart, were non-profit teaching 
institutions that delivered primary, secondary, and tertiary care.292 
The court determined that the consumers in this case consisted of: 
(1) patients who self-payor have indemnity insurance; (2) physicians 
and physician groups who exercise control over the selection of the 
hospital network; (3) managed care plans; (4) employers who exert 
control over the selection of a hospital network; and (5) government 
payors, such as Medicare and Medicaid.293 The court defined the rel-
evant product market as general acute-care inpatient hospital ser-
vices.294 It also determined the relevant geographic market to be: (1) 
primary and secondary care provided by the two hospitals in Queens 
and Nassau; and (2) tertiary care provided in Manhattan, Queens, 
Nassau, and western Suffolk County.295 The court did not find any 
anticompetitive effects of the merger, such as reduced service to, or 
286. Id. at 1295-1302. But see Hospital Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1390 
(7th Cir. 1986) (indicating that non-profit status does not mean the firm 
will refrain from acting in an anticompetitive manner, and that non-profit 
status does not necessarily demonstrate the firm's willingness to cooperate 
in reducing prices). 
287. Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1302 (giving deference to the hospitals' effi-
ciency analysis and condemning the FTC's mere critique of the hospitals' 
analysis). 
288. Id. at 1302. 
289. Id. at 1303. 
290. 983 F. Supp. 121 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). 
291. Id. at 125. Long IslandJewish Medical Center is located in eastern Queens 
County. See id. North Shore Manhasset, the major hospital in the North 
Shore System, is located in northwestern Nassau County. See id. 
292. Id. 
293. Long Island, 983 F. Supp. at 134. 
294. Id. at 139. 
295. Id. at 141-42 (noting that some residents of Queens, Nassau and Suffolk will 
go to Manhattan for treatment). 
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treatment of patients.296 The court reached this conclusion despite 
both hospitals being teaching hospitals, direct competitors, and po-
tential acquisition targets of MCOS.297 
Although the court did not have to proceed with its discussion, as it 
determined that the DO] failed to establish that the merger would 
result in a substantial lessening of competition in any relevant market, 
the court went on to discuss the efficiencies that further supported its 
decision.298 Despite the fact that the DO] successfully disproved some 
of the claimed efficiencies, the court agreed with the hospitals that 
the merger would create substantial efficiencies, noting, however, that 
the amount of savings directly relating to the merger was difficult to 
ascertain.299 In addition, the court relied on the hospitals' written 
agreement with the Attorney General of New York, indicating their 
commitment to pass savings onto the community.30o 
Long Island and Butterworth are examples of the deference given to 
hospitals' efficiencies defense.301 In particular, both courts gave great 
weight to the hospitals' written commitment to their respective com-
munities. These written commitments contained promises to main-
tain prices and to continue to serve the poor and indigent 
population.302 
Although the DO] did not succeed in establishing a prima facie case 
in Long Island, the court explained that the efficiency defense was still 
sufficient to warrant discussion and approval. In Butterworth, the FTC 
established a prima facie case; however, the court determined that the 
hospitals' efficiencies defense successfully rebutted the presumption 
of illegality.303 
It appears, from these cases, that a written community commitment 
is sufficient to overcome a merger challenge. These types of commit-
ments, however, are not binding on a hospital. While the community 
(consumers) may pressure the hospital to abide by its commitment, 
third-party payors may also exert pressure on the hospital. As dis-
cussed, these organizations have much greater leverage than consum-
ers, and can more easily and effectively cause the hospital to limit 
consumer choice. 
296. Id. at 142 (indicating, however, that the DO] failed to show a lack of alter-
natives if prices increased). 
297. Id. at 145. 
298. Id. at 146-49. 
299. Id. at 148. 
300. Id. at 149; FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1301 (W.D. 
Mich. 1996). 
301. See Long Island, 983 F. Supp. at 149; Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 130l. 
302. See Long Island, 983 F. Supp. at 126-27; Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1298. 
303. Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1302. 
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Moreover, the American Hospital Association (AHA) recently con-
ducted a study to examine hospital mergers in the 1980s and 1990s to 
assess how the effects of increased market power balanced against in-
creased economic efficiency.304 The study addressed two questions: 
(1) to what extent and under what circumstances have hospital merg-
ers improved efficiency; and (2) who benefits from hospital merg-
ers-consumers in terms of lower prices, hospitals in terms of greater 
profits, or both?305 
The study indicates that the top five reasons hospitals merge are: 
(1) to strengthen their financial position; (2) to achieve operating ef-
ficiencies; (3) to consolidate services; (4) to expand market share; and 
(5) to expand access to care.306 The second and third reasons relate 
directly to efficiencies. The fourth reason, to expand market share, is 
especially noteworthy in a merger analysis. 
The study found that 58% of acquired hospitals continued to offer 
acute inpatient care following a merger, but 17% of the acquired hos-
pitals closed.307 While closure may be "efficient," it can severely limit 
consumer choice. 
The AHA study concluded that "hospital mergers offer opportuni-
ties for achieving efficiencies through a variety of means."308 While 
the strategies for achieving efficiencies varied, none were universally 
adopted, and most depended on the organizational structure of the 
merging hospitals.3og 
c. FTC v. Staples: The Agencies Preferred Efficiency Analysis Which Protects 
Consumers 
The FTC indicated that it prefers an analysis of the efficiencies de-
fense in accordance with FTC v. Staples, Inc. 310 In 1996, Staples and 
Office Depot entered into an agreement whereby Marlin Acquisition 
Corporation, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Staples, "would merge with 
and into Office Depot, and Office Depot would become a wholly-
owned subsidiary of Staples."311 At that time, Office Depot and 
Staples were the first and second largest office superstore chains, re-
304. See AMERICAN HOSPITAL AsSOCIATION, EFFECTS OF HOSPITAL MERGERS ON 
MARKET POWER AND EFFICIENCIES, at http://www.aha.org/hret/r_ehm.asp 
(last visited Jan. 9, 2000). 
305. Id. 
306. Id. at Exhibit l. 
307. Id. at Exhibit 2. 
308. Id. at Discussion and Conclusion. 
309. Id. 
310. 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997); see also Valentine, supra note 265, at *6. 
The FTC was successful in preventing the Staples-Office Depot merger. 
31l. Staples, 970 F. Supp. at 1069. 
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spectively, in the United States.SI2 The FTC sought a preliminary in-
junction to enjoin the merger under the FTC Act. SIS In order to 
succeed on a motion for preliminary injunction, the FTC only had to 
prove that there was a "reasonable probability" that the challenged 
merger would have anticompetitive effects.314 
The FTC defined the relevant geographic market as forty-two met-
ropolitan areas where consumers could practically turn for alterna-
tives and where the defendants faced competition.315 The defendants 
did not dispute the FTC's definition and the court, therefore, ac-
cepted the geographic market as defined by the FTC.3I6 The court 
found that the relevant product market was the sale of office supplies 
through office supply superstores.317 The court also found that the 
merger would allow Staples to increase prices or maintain prices at an 
anticompetitive level because the merger would effectively eliminate 
Staples' only rival and competition.318 
As to the efficiencies, the court found that the defendants' efficien-
cies defense did not rebut the presumption that the merger would 
have anticompetitive effects.319 The defendants submitted an "Effi-
ciencies Analysis" in support of its asserted savings between $4.9 and 
$6.5 billion over the first five years of the merger.320 Staples and Of-
fice Depot argued that as suppliers became more efficient, the suppli-
ers would be able to lower prices to other retailers, and also that two-
thirds of the savings realized by the merged Staples and Office Depot 
would be passed on to consumers.321 
As evidenced in the opinion, the court looked closely at the credi-
bility of the defendants' documents.322 First, the court indicated that 
the cost savings were unreliable because the numbers were inflated by 
almost 500%.323 Second, the court determined that the savings were 
unverified, or at least the defendants neglected to produce the imper-
312. Id. 
313. Id. (pending the FTC's final determination in its administrative proceed-
ings to determine whether the merger would violate section 7 of the Clay-
ton Act and section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act). 
314. Id. at 1072. Accord FTC v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1218 (11th 
Cir 1991). 
315. Staples, 970 F. Supp. at 1073. 
316. Id. 
317. Staples, 970 F. Supp. at 1080. 
318. Id. at 1082. 
319. Id. at 1090. 
320. Id. at 1089. 
321. Id. 
322. See id. 
323. Id. 
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ative documentation for verification.324 Third, the defendants did not 
precisely calculate which savings were merger-specific.325 Fourth, the 
defendants' methodology in making some of the projected savings was 
problematic.326 Finally, the court determined that the two-thirds sav-
ings projected to be passed on to consumers was unrealistic. 327 
Given the court's detailed analysis of the defendants' projected effi-
ciencies, it is clear why the FTC prefers an analysis of this sort. In 
addition, the defendants' evidence was highly inflated,328 catching the 
immediate attention of the court. The apparent inaccuracies of the 
defendants' efficiency evidence indicate the difficulty in presenting, 
and winning, an efficiencies defense and the need for the most accu-
rate information possible. 
d. What the Agencies can do to Protect Consumers 
Although hospitals do not technically "produce" anything, they do 
offer services. When hospitals merge, they either consolidate all ser-
vices in one facility and close the remaining facility, or they offer cer-
tain services at one facility and different services at the other 
facility.329 In either case, the services are consolidated to reduce du-
plication and costs.330 However, the question remains whether the 
consolidation is "efficient" given that patients may lose their ability to 
choose. 
The efficiencies defense presented by hospitals may be the most dif-
ficult obstacle the FTC and DO] must overcome in order to protect 
consumer choice. The Agencies should use the Staples case as a model 
to rebut efficiencies offered by the merging hospitals. In accordance 
with Staples, the Agencies should: (1) ensure that cost savings are relia-
ble; (2) verifY those savings; (3) separate merger-specific savings from 
those savings that can be achieved without a merger; (4) define a 
methodology for calculating savings; and (5) ensure that the savings, 
which will be passed to the consumers, are reliable. 
Considering the deference courts give to merging hospital's "com-
munity commitment" plans, the Agencies should carefully scrutinize 
these plans in accordance with a model rebuttal that they adopt. The 
324. Id. at 1089-90 (noting that the defendants' efficiencies witness was unable 
to explain the methods used to calculate many of the savings). 
325. Id. at 1090 (indicating that some of the projected efficiencies could be real-
ized without the merger). 
326. Id. (noting that cost savings from select vendors were extrapolated to all 
vendors). 
327. Id. (indicating that Staples' historical pass through rate is only 15 to 17%). 
328. Id. at 1089-90. 
329. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text. 
330. See Choslovsky, supra note 24, at 292, 296. 
2000] Hospital Mergers Versus Consumers 113 
most accurate information possible is the key to a successful rebuttal 
by the Agencies. More importantly, consumers should be the center 
of each step of the rebuttal. 
In addition, given the strong influence of managed care, the Agen-
cies should question whether projected savings will actually be passed 
to consumers or whether the savings will ultimately be usurped by the 
MCOs. Consumers have far less bargaining power with hospitals, 
while MCOs directly negotiate rates and reimbursement. In the event 
that an MCO reduces the reimbursement for a hospital, the hospital 
and consumers are required to pay more, thereby effectively reducing 
any savings that should have passed to consumers. 
In sum, if merging hospitals are unable to specifically identify and 
quantify the efficiencies resulting from a merger, they should not be 
allowed to limit consumer choice. In order to prevent hospitals from 
limiting consumer choice, the Agencies must present a stronger case 
against the merger. Again, the focus of any challenge should be en-
suring and protecting consumer choice. 
VI. THE RURAL EXCEPTION: THE UKIAH CASE AND ITS IM-
PACT ON CONSUMERS 
The 1996 Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Healthcare 
provide an exception for hospital mergers in rural areas. 331 The 
Agencies recognize that rural hospitals with less than 100 beds and 
fewer than a daily average of 40 inpatients are unlikely to achieve effi-
ciencies enjoyed by larger hospitals.332 Some of those cost-saving effi-
ciencies may be realized, however, through a merger with another 
hospital. 333 The 1996 Statements indicate that rural hospitals are 
more likely to achieve economies of scale if they are allowed to 
merge.334 This exception further undermines consumer choice. A re-
cent California case further explains the rural exception. 
331. 1996 DOJ/FTC STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTH 
CARE, available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/hlth3s.htm. at Statement 1. 





The Agencies recognize that in some cases a general acute care 
hospital with fewer than lOO licensed beds and an average daily 
inpatient census of fewer than 40 patients will be the only hospital 
in a relevant market. As such, the hospital does not compete in any 
significant way with other hospitals. Accordingly, mergers involv-
ing such hospitals are unlikely to reduce competition substantially. 
114 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 30 
Ukiah, California is located in Mendocino County in a valley sepa-
rated by the Coastal Range from the Pacific Ocean.335 Nearby towns 
include Willits, twenty-three miles to the north, and Lakeport, thirty-
four miles to the southeast.336 The closest urban centers are Santa 
Rosa, sixty miles to the south, and San Francisco, 120 miles away.337 
Ukiah was originally the home to three hospitals, however one 
closed in 1992.338 The only two remaining hospitals located in Ukiah 
were Ukiah Adventist Hospital (UAR) and Ukiah General Hospital 
(UGH).339 Two other small hospitals, both offering primary care ser-
vices, were located in Willits and Lakeport.34o The largest hospitals in 
the area included those in Santa Rosa and San Francisco.341 
In 1988, UAR entered into an agreement to purchase UGH.342 
UAR was a forty-three bed hospital that offered primary care services 
and some ancillary services, but no obstetrical services.343 UGH was a 
fifty-one bed hospital that offered similar services, but also included 
an obstetrical unit and neonatal care services.344 The FTC Staff chal-
lenged the merger on the basis that it violated section 7 of the Clayton 
Act bec'ause Adventist Health System/West ("ARS/West") controlled 
three of five area hospitals, including UAR.345 
In determining the relevant geographic market, the FTC Commis-
sion examined the likely response of health insurance plans, patients, 
patient discharge statistics, alternative hospitals, and physician privi-
335. Adventist Health Sys./West, 117 F.T.C. 224, 285 (1994). This case was chal-
lenged and reviewed according to the FTC's administrative process. The 
FTC Staff first brought the case before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). 
Mter the ALJ dismissed the case, the Staff appealed to the FTC Commis-
sion. It was not subsequently litigated in court. Accordingly, "FTC Staff' 
refers to the FTC employees challenging the merger. "FTC Commission" 
refers to the administrative panel that rendered this decision. 
336. [d. 
337. [d. 
338. [d, at 286-87. 
339. [d. at 286. 
340. [d. at 287. 
341. [d. 
342. [d. at 286. UAH was managed and controlled by Adventist Health System/ 
West (AHS/West). [d. 
343. [d. at 286-87. 
344. [d. 
345. See Erwin A. Blackstone and Joseph P. Fuhr,Jr., Rural Hospital Mergers, Anti-
trust Policy, and the Ukiah Case, 23 J. HEALTH POLITICS POL'y & L. 949,955-56 
(1998). The merger of UAH and UGH increased AHS/West's market 
share from 38% to 71 % and increased the HHI from about 3,100 to 5,600. 
See id. at 955-56; Adventist Health Sys./West, 117 F.T.C. at 288-97. 
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leges.346 The FTC Staff argued that the relevant geographic area was 
Ukiah-Willits-Lakeport, or in the alternative Ukiah-Willits.347 The 
FTC Commission, and, previously, the Administrative Law Judge re-
jected this argument.348 
First, the FTC agreed that insurers are sensitive to price increases, 
and as a result, may seek to steer patients to lower cost hospitals.349 
The FTC Commission could not, however, determine from the record 
the degree of price sensitivity that would undermine an anticompeti-
tive price increase.35o Second, the FTC determined, according to E-H 
statistics, that the geographic market was not confined to the Ukiah-
Willits-Lakeport area.351 Finally, the FTC Commission determined 
that there was no plausible reason to exclude Lakeport from the 
Ukiah-Willits geographic market.352 
The decision stated that the FTC Staff failed to prove that Ukiah-
Willits-Lakeport or Ukiah-Willits were the relevant geographic mar-
kets,353 although what is not stated in the decision is equally as impor-
tant. The decision implicitly supports wide geographic markets for 
rural hospitals.354 In addition, the willingness of 25% of Ukiah re-
sidents to travel to distant areas for health care does not protect the 
75% of residents unwilling to travel for health care services.355 Fur-
thermore, testimony indicated that the presence of two hospitals in 
Ukiah made administrators more sensitive to quality concerns and 
physician requests for new equipment.356 The decision, however, im-
plies that the merged Ukiah facility will be responsive to competition 
346. Adventist Health Sys./West, 117 F.T.C. at 288-97. The parties did not disagree 
about the definition of the relevant product market, and the FTC Commis-
sion accepted the ALl's decision that the relevant product market consisted 
of acute inpatient care hospital services. Id. at 288 . 
. 347. [d. at 285. 
348. Adventist Health Sys., 117 F.T.C. at 284-85. 
349. [d. at 291. 
350. [d. 
351. [d. at 292-93. The statistics indicated that although the hospitals drew 91 
percent of their patients from the area, approximately 25 percent of pa-
tients sought hospital services outside of these three areas. [d. at 294. 
352. [d. at 293-94 (noting the lack of testimony indicating that patients could not 
go to Lakeport). The FTC's expert advocated the Ukiah-Willits-Lakeport 
market, not the Ukiah-Willits market. [d. In addition, the hospital in Wil-
lits was an affiliate of AHS/West and was unlikely to be a competitive alter-
native if the merged Ukiah hospitals raised prices. [d. 
353. [d. at 297. 
354. See Blackstone and Fuhr, supra note 345, at 959. 
355. See id; see also Adventist Health Sys./West, 117 F.T.C. at 294. 
356. Adventist Health Sys./West, 117 F.T.C. at 294; Blackstone and Fuhr, supra 
note 345, at 960. 
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located sixty miles away.357 While the merger produced some efficien-
cies, such as the elimination of duplicate services, the merger also 
eliminated local competition that served to bolster the quality of hos-
pital services. It appears unwise to assume that a small rural hospital, 
offering only primary care services and obstetric services, will remain 
conscious of what a larger urban tertiary care facility sixty miles away is 
doing with respect to quality and prices.358 
The general rule, that competition fosters lower costs and more effi-
cient services, does not apply to a merger between two entities located 
in a rural area.359 This is known as the rural exception. In effect, this 
exception promotes anti-competitive behavior and allows rural hospi-
tals to merge regardless of the consequences to consumers. In the 
Ukiah case, the Administrative Law Judge determined, however, that 
the duplication of services in a rural area actually increased the cost of 
health care because the duplicated services sparked a "medical arms 
race."360 
In a rural merger case, economies of scale often justifY and provide 
support for the merger of the only two providers.361 Small rural hos-
pitals often suffer from higher costs, making it more difficult to realize 
an economy of scale.362 The merger of two rural hospitals can elimi-
nate inefficiency and overcapacity (an excess number of beds) and 
achieve an economy of scale.363 
Two additional standards can also justifY a rural hospital merger: 
(1) the minimum efficient size for a hospital is at least 100 beds;364 
and (2) a new standard is one and one-half to two beds per 1000 peo-
ple.365 If applied to the Ukiah case, these standards support the 
merger. First, UAH and UGH combined have ninety-four beds,366 just 
six beds short of the efficient size.367 Second, Ukiah's population of 
40,000 justifies between sixty and eighty beds.368 The numbers indi-
357. See Blackstone and Fuhr, supra note 345, at 969. 
358. See generally Blackstone and Fuhr, supra note 345. 
359. See id. at 969-70. 
360. See id. at 961. 
361. See id. at 966. 
362. See id. at 964. 
363. See id. at 964-66. 
364. See id. at 964. 
365. See id. 
366. See Adventist Health Sys./West, 117 F.T.C. at 286; see also Blackstone and Fuhr, 
supra note 363, at 955 (indicating that UAH had forty-three beds and UGH 
had fifty-one beds). 
367. See Blackstone and Fuhr, supra note 363, at 964. 
368. See id. 
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cate that Ukiah can efficiently support only one hospital, and the 
merger succeeded. 
The rural exception, as set forth in the 1996 Statements,369 is con-
tradictory to the goal of providing consumers with a wide range of 
choices.37o Choice in a rural area can be completely eliminated, yet 
the merger is allowed to proceed. The merger essentially dictates 
where patients must go for care and what services the patients can 
easily obtain. Efficiencies and economies of scale prevail over con-
sumer choice. The focus may still be on the consumer by providing 
lower prices through an economy of scale, but the focus is not on 
consumer choice. 
VII. THE SHERMAN ACT 
The Sherman Act prohibits "every contract, combination in the 
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or com-
merce" in interstate commerce.371 The main purpose of the Sherman 
Act is to prevent combinations, such as mergers or acquisitions, and 
conspiracies, such as those to raise prices, in undue restraint of trade 
or tending to monopolize the free market.372 The FTC's jurisdiction 
under the Sherman Act is very broad, and is "generally coextensive 
with Congressional authority under the Commerce Clause."373 The 
FTC's jurisdiction under the Clayton Act is more limited,374 however, 
the purposes of each act are similar. The Sherman Act and the Clay-
ton Act both seek to prohibit combinations of companies that would 
interfere with the free market and thus lessen competition. 
A. Possible Convergence of the Clayton and Sherman Acts 
The Clayton Act's purpose is to stop restraints of trade in their in-
cipiency.375 The purpose of the Sherman Act is to nullify agreements 
369. See supra note 331 for the text of Statement 1. 
370. But see 1996 DOJ/FfC STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN 
HEALTH CARE, available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/hlth3s.htm at Intr~ 
duction (stating that a goal of the exception is to provide consumers with a 
range of choices). 
371. 15 U.S.CA § 1 (West 1997). 
372. See generally D.R. Wilder Mfg. Co. v. Corn Prods. Ref. Co., 236 U.S. 165 
(1915); United States v. Am. Optical Co., 97 F. Supp. 66 (N.D. Ill. 1951). 
373. Bhan v. NME Hosp., Inc., 669 F. Supp. 998, 1010 (E.D. Cal. 1987). 
374. See supra notes 133-62 and accompanying text. 
375. See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text; see also Baker, supra note 14, 
at 113. 
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currently restraining trade. 376 Hence, the intent of the two acts is dif-
ferent, but the practical distinction between them is insignificant.377 
The court's application of the Clayton Act in Hospital Corporation of 
America v. FrQ378 explained that mergers are forbidden if they are 
likely to "hurt consumers, as by making it easier for the firms in the 
market to collude, expressly or tacitly, and thereby force price above 
or farther above the competitive level. "379 A merger with the effect of 
increasing prices would also violate section 1 of the Sherman Act380 
because, "[b]oth statutes as currently understood prevent transac-
tions likely to reduce competition substantially."381 
Given the unresolved nature of the difference, if any, between judg-
ing the lawfulness of a transaction under section 1 of the Sherman Act 
or section 7 of the Clayton Act, an analysis of cases decided under the 
Sherman Act will be discussed. Sherman Act cases may provide addi-
tional guidance for the agencies when challenging a hospital merger 
case that lessens consumer choice. 
B. Case Law Under the Sherman Act Applying the Rule of Reason Analysis 
In the following Sherman Act cases that will be examined, the 
courts applied the Rule of Reason analysis. The Rule of Reason analy-
sis was adopted from common law382 and prohibits acts, agreements, 
or contracts that prejudice public interest, obstruct the due course of 
trade, or injuriously restrain trade.383 The test of legality under the 
Rule of Reason is whether the restraint imposed regulates and per-
haps promotes competition, or whether it suppresses or destroys com-
petition.384 Absent some pro-competitive virtue, such as the creation 
376. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 1997); see also Baker, sUfrra note 14, at 113. 
377. See Baker, supra note 14, at 113. 
378. 807 F.2d 1381 (7th Cir. 1986). 
379. Id. at 1386. 
380. See United States v. Rockford Mem'l Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1285, 1283 (7th 
Cir. 1990); see also 15 U.S.CA § 1 (West 1997). 
381. Rnckford, 898 F.2d at 1283. 
382. See 54 AM. ]UR. 2D Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and Unfair Trade Practices 
§ 48 (1996). The Supreme Court adopted the Rule of Reason analysis in 
United States v. E. 1. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 386-87 (1956) 
and Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1,61-62 (1911). 
383. See 54 AM. ]UR. 2D Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and Unfair Trade Practices 
§ 48 (1996). 
384. See id. This test was articulated in National Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs v. United 
States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978) (quoting Board of Trade of Chicago v. 
United States, 246 U.S. 231,238 (1918», and FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 
476 U.S. 447, 458-59 (1986) (holding that a refusal to compete with respect 
to a package of services offered to customers impaired "the ability of the 
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of efficiencies, conduct that impairs the natural ability of the market 
to provide desired goods or services cannot be sustained under the 
Rule of Reason analysis.385 
This analysis requires a determination of the particular facts of each 
case.386 In some cases, a determination of reasonableness may de-
pend on the intent of the conduct and the method used to obtain 
control over commerce or competition.387 A good intention, how-
ever, will not evade scrutiny under section 1 of the Sherman Act.388 
Conduct violates section 1 of the Sherman Act if an unreasonable re-
straint is either its intent or effect.389 
1. National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States 
National Society of Professional Engineers v. United State~90 specifically 
addresses the issue of consumer choice. The National Society of Pro-
fessional Engineers (Society) was a society that dealt with the non-
technical aspects of the engineering practice.391 Such aspects in-
cluded the promotion of its members' professional, social, and eco-
nomic interests.392 In pertinent part, section 11 of the Society's Code 
of Ethics states: 
The Engineer will not compete unfairly with another engi-
neer by attempting to obtain employment or advancement 
or professional engagements by competitive bidding .... He 
shall not solicit or submit engineering proposals on the basis 
of competitive bidding .... An Engineer requested to sub-
mit a fee proposal or bid prior to the selection of an engi-
neer or firm subject to the negotiation of a satisfactory 
contract, shall attempt to have the procedure changed to 
conform to ethical practices, but if not successful he shall 
withdraw from consideration for the proposed work.393 
market to advance social welfare by ensuring the provision of desired goods 
and services to consumers at a price approximating the marginal cost of 
providing them"). 
385. See 54 AM. JUR. 20 Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and Unfair Trade Practices 
§ 48 (1996). 
386. See id. 
387. See id. 
388. See id. 
389. See id. 
390. 435 U.S. 679 (1978). 
391. [d. at 682. 
392. [d. 
393. National Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 683 n.3 (quoting section 11 (c) of 
Society's Code of Ethics). 
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The Society forbade its members from negotiating or discussing fees 
until after the prospective client selected an engineer.394 
The DO] filed a complaint under section 1 of the Sherman Act al-
leging that price competition among the members was suppressed 
and that customers were deprived of the benefits of the free mar-
ket. 395 The Society argued that section 11 of their Code of Ethics was 
reasonable because competition among professional engineers was 
contrary to the public interest, and the prohibition of competitive bid-
ding was necessary to protect the public's health, safety, and 
welfare.396 
The Court, however, disagreed.397 In its analysis, the Court applied 
the Rule of Reason analysis to determine whether the proscription on 
competitive bidding impacted competitive conditions.398 "[T]he pur-
pose of the analysis is to form ajudgment about the competitive signif-
icance of the restraint .... "399 
The Court determined that the agreement in section 11 constituted 
an absolute ban on competitive bidding.40o The Court agreed with 
the district court ruling that the ban "'impedes the ordinary give and 
take of the market place,' and substantially deprives the customer of 
'the ability to utilize and compare prices in selecting engineering ser-
vices.' "401 The ban on competitive bidding prevented customers from 
making price comparisons when initially attempting to select an engi-
neer, and also imposed the Society's views of costs and benefits on the 
entire market.402 
2. FTC v. Indiana Federation oj Dentists 
FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists403 is a case closer on point 
because it directly relates to the health care industry. In an effort to 
contain costs, dental health insurers implemented "alternative bene-
fits" plans that required an evaluation by the insurer of the treating 
394. Id. at 684. 
395. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 1997). 
396. National Soc'y of ProJ'l Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 684-85. 
397. Id. at 693-94. 
398. Id. at 688. The analysis under the Rule of Reason is to determine whether 
the restraint promoted or suppressed competition. Id. at 691. See also 
supra notes 386-89 for a discussion of the Rule of Reason analysis. 
399. Id. at 692. 
400. Id. 
401. Id. at 692-693 (quoting United States v. National Soc'y of Prof! Eng'rs, 404 
F. Supp. 457,460 (D.D.C. 1975)). 
402. See id. at 695. 
403. 476 U.S. 447 (1986). 
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dentist's diagnosis and recommendation.404 Insurers often requested 
the dentist to submit the x-rays used to examine the patient, the neces-
sary insurance claim forms, and any other information concerning the 
patient's diagnosis and recommended treatment.405 
In an effort to hinder the implementation of these alternative bene-
fit plans, approximately eighty-five percent of dentists in Indiana 
formed the Indiana Dental Association (IDA) and refused to submit x-
rays, in conjunction with claim forms, to insurers.406 The IDA was suc-
cessful and many insurers were unable to obtain compliance with 
their requests for x_rays.407 As a result, insurers were forced either to 
use more expensive means of making alternative benefits determina-
tions, such as visiting the dentists' office, or to completely abandon 
their efforts.408 Eventually, out of fear of antitrust liability, a majority 
of the dentists in IDA agreed to the FrC's cease and desist order.409 
A number of dentists, who were still unwilling to comply with the 
insurers' requests and to submit x-rays, formed the Indiana Federa-
tion of Dentists (IFD) in order to continue the original plan initiated 
by the IDA.410 In an effort to disguise itself from antitrust agencies, 
the IFD labeled itself a "union"411 and then issued a rule forbidding 
members to submit x_rays.412 
The FrC found, in its own hearing, that IFD's restraint was an un-
fair method of competition and violated section 5 of the Federal 
404. Id. at 449. 
405. Id. 
406. Id. at 449-50. An IDA official revealed the dentists' motive in refusing to 
comply with requests relating to alternative benefits plan determinations: 
We are fighting an economic war where the very survival of our 
profession is at stake .... The name of the game is money. The 
government and labor are determined to reduce the cost of the 
dental health dollar at the expense of the dentist. There is no way 
a dental service can be rendered cheaper when the third party has 
to have its share of the dollar. 
Id. at 450 n.1. This can be construed as further evidence of the influence of 
third-party payors. 
407. Id. at 450. 
408. Id. at 450. 
409. Id. at 450-51. 
410. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 451. 
411. Id. Labor unions have certain exemptions from antitrust liability. 
412. Id. 
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Trade Commission Act.413 IFD sought judicial review from the Sev-
enth Circuit,414 and the FTC appealed to the Supreme Court.415 
The Court found that the FTC's findings were supported by sub-
stantial evidence, that IFD's actions constituted a violation of section 1 
of the Sherman Act, and thus also, that IFD's actions violated section 5 
of the FTC Act.416 In reaching this conclusion, the Court again ap-
plied the Rule of Reason analysis.417 
The Court determined that IFD's policy amounted to a horizontal 
agreement that served to withhold a service that customers desired: 
the forwarding of x-rays along with claim forms. 418 This refusal to 
compete impaired the market's ability to advance social welfare byen-
suring the provision of desired goods and services.419 In sum, IFD was 
not allowed to determine, on behalf of its customers, who were both 
patients and their insurers, which goods or services they should 
receive.420 
Following the decision in National Society of Professional Engineers v. 
United States,421 the IFD Court stated: 
Absent some countervailing procompetitive virtue - such as, 
for example, the creation of efficiencies in the operation of a 
market or the provision of goods and services, - such an 
agreement limiting consumer choice by impeding the 'ordi-
nary give and take of the market place,' cannot be sustained 
under the Rule of Reason.422 
The Court stated that the FTC's failure to engage in a detailed mar-
ket analysis was not fatal to its finding of a violation of the Rule of 
Reason.423 Although the purpose of market analysis is to determine 
whether the activity in question had the potential to produce adverse 
effects on competition, proof of actual detrimental effects obviated 
the need for a detailed market analysis.424 
413. Id. 
414. See Indiana Fed'n of Dentists v. FTC, 745 F.2d 1124, 1126 (7th Cir. 1984). 
The Seventh Circuit vacated the cease and desist order on the grounds that 
it was not supported by substantial evidence. See id. 
415. See Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 453. 
416. Id. at 465-66. 




421. 435 U.S. 679 (1978). 
422. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 459 (quoting National Soc; of Profl 
Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 692) (citations omitted). 
423. Id. at 460. 
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3. Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. 
In Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak CO.,425 the plaintiff 
alleged that Kodak restricted access to its photocopier and micro-
graphic parts by refusing to sell these necessary parts to independent 
service organizations (ISOs).426 ISOs were limited in their ability to 
compete in the service market for Kodak machines due to the restric-
tion on parts.427 
Service and parts for Kodak equipment were not interchangeable 
with other service and parts, hence the court defined the relevant 
market as those companies that serviced Kodak machines.428 The re-
cord revealed that Kodak had a ninety-five percent share of the Kodak 
high volume copier service market and an eighty-eight percent share 
of the Kodak micrographic service market.429 When Kodak began im-
plementing restrictions on the availability of its parts, some ISOs with-
drew from the Kodak service market or substantially restricted their 
service since parts were not readily available.430 As a result, Kodak 
customers were "locked-in" to obtaining the necessary service and 
parts from Kodak.431 
Evidence showed that Kodak practiced price discrimination by sell-
ing parts to customers who serviced their own equipment, but refus-
ing to sell parts to customers who hired ISOs.432 In addition, the cost 
of switching to a different product was expensive.433 These two factors 
combined "locked-in" customers.434 The Court stated that: 
If the cost of switching is high, consumers who already have 
purchased the equipment, and are thus "locked-in," will tol-
erate some level of service-price increases before changing 
equipment brands. Under this scenario, a seller profitably 
could maintain supracompetitive prices in the aftermarket if 
the switching costs were high relative to the increase in ser-
425. 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997). 
426. Id. at 1201. 
427. Id. 
428. Id. at 1203 (citing Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs. Inc., 504 
U.S. 451, 482 (1992». 
429. Id. at 1212. 
430. Id. 
431. Id., 125 F.3d at 1212. The Ninth Circuit, hearing the case on remand, did 
not fully discuss the "lock-in" concept, but included a reference to the Su-
preme Court case that discussed the concept. See id. 
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vice prices, and the number of locked-in customers were 
high relative to the number of new purchasers.435 
The Court concluded that a jury could reasonably infer that Kodak 
made a conscious choice to gain immediate profits by exerting market 
power where locked-in customers, high information costs, and dis-
criminatory pricing limited long-term 10ss.436 
In addition to acknowledging that customers experienced a "lock-
in," the Ninth Circuit also concluded that Kodak's market share in the 
equipment market further limited consumers' choices.437 In sum, Ko-
dak refused to deal with its customers in order to control a down-
stream market.438 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
"Hospital markets are predominandy local in nature and, by con-
ventional measures often, highly concentrated."439 In addition, hospi-
tals provide unique services. As one court stated: 
For many services provided by acute-care hospitals, there is 
no competition from other sorts ofprovider[s]. If you need 
a kidney transplant, or a mastectomy, or if you have a stroke 
or a heart attack or a gunshot wound, you will go (or be 
taken) to an acute-care hospital for inpatient treatment. The 
fact that for other services you have a choice between inpa-
tient care at such a hospital and outpatient care elsewhere 
places no check on the prices of the services we have listed, 
for their prices are not linked to the prices of services that 
are not substitutes or complements. If you need your hip 
replaced, you can't decide to have chemotherapy instead be-
cause it's available on an outpatient basis at a lower price.440 
As the judge in Rockford emphasized, there are no substitutes for cer-
tain services. For many services, the consumer's choice is already lim-
ited to either having the necessary treatment or not. 
There is no question that health care expenses are high and contin-
uously increasing, but consumers should not have their choices lim-
ited because merging hospitals claim efficiencies that are often not 
justified. In addition, consumers should not be pawns of managed 
care organizations and third-party payors. The consumers in this in-
435. Id. 
436. Id. at 477-78. 
437. Image Technical Seros., 125 F.3d at 1212. 
438. Id. at 1211. 
439. Raskin & Zessar, supra note 21, at 21. 
440. United States v. Rockford Mem'l Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1284 (7th Cir. 
1990). 
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stance are patients with specific health care needs. They should be 
able to receive the necessary treatment from the doctor or hospital of 
their choice. 
As Philadelphia National Bank pointed out, consumers should be at 
the forefront of the merger analysis.441 Often, "there is no alternative 
source outside the realm of general acute care inpatient hospitals to 
which a patient can tum to obtain such services in response to a small 
but significant price increase."442 In addition, consumers generally 
will not use outpatient services as a substitute for some inpatient ser-
vices in response to price increases of general acute-care inpatient 
services.443 
Choice can still be limited, despite the fact that the FTC and DO] 
attempt to ensure that more than one hospital is available in any given 
geographic area to guarantee consumer choice.444 While the Agen-
cies have a foundation of case law on which to rely in arguing against a 
hospital merger that limits consumer choice,445 some additional im-
provements can be made. 
Hospitals should be held to the efficiencies standard and analysis 
contained in Staples.446 Hospital efficiency studies should be carefully 
scrutinized to ensure with some certainty that the efficiencies will be 
realized and passed on to consumers. 
Furthermore, a uniform standard needs to be implemented in or-
der to define the geographic market area. As shown by the case law, 
the Agencies and the hospitals have several different ways to measure 
the geographic market.447 However, uniform standards should en-
sure that consumers have a viable alternative if the merger is allowed. 
A hospital located forty or sixty miles away, such as in rural cases, is 
not necessarily a viable alternative, particularly in the case of an emer-
gency where the patient requires trauma or tertiary care services. This 
rationale should also apply to reproductive services. Patients should 
not be forced, due to a merger, to travel extensive distances, thereby 
increasing costs, to obtain elective health care services. 
The rural exception448 should also be carefully analyzed. In many 
rural cases, the merger is justified by the numbers.449 The agencies, 
441. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
442. FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1290 (W.D. Mich. 
1996). 
443. See id. 
444. See Choslovsky, supra note 24, at 309. 
445. See supra Part V. 
446. See supra Part V.C.2.c. for a discussion of FTC v. Staples. 
447. See supra Part V. C.l.h. 
448. See supra Part VI. 
449. See supra notes 331-34 and accompanying text. 
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however, must ensure that the merger will not eliminate a service pre-
viously provided by the merging hospitals. In addition, the large geo-
graphic market areas usually defined in rural cases450 should be 
reviewed. While some rural consumers may be willing to travel longer 
distances to obtain necessary health care services, other rural consum-
ers may be less willing to travel or simply cannot afford to travel. 451 
These large geographic markets could present a problem if a rural 
patient required an extensive stay at an urban hospital. The immedi-
ate family may be required to drive back and forth, possibly 120 to 240 
miles roundtrip like in the Ukiah case,452 or have to stay at a hotel near 
the urban hospital. 
The Agencies should further ensure that consumers do not get 
"locked-in" to only one hospital.453 The combination of merger ef-
fects and the strong influence of third-party payors could disadvantage 
consumers. This powerful combination could eliminate consumer 
choice. 
Proper analysis under the Clayton Act,454 or possibly the Sherman 
Act,455 could ensure that consumers will continue to have a choice 
regarding their health care needs. If a merger is allowed, the agencies 
should ensure that the merged institution does not later find it "effi-
cient" to discontinue a service. 
In sum, competition ensures consumer choice and protects con-
sumers from paying too much for their health care needs. If the anti-
trust laws are not able to protect consumers, then other methods need 
to be explored, such as procedural reform. Current case law does pro-
vide a foundation for a merger challenge, however some aspects still 
need further analysis and reform. The agencies need to resort back to 
the original purpose of the Clayton Act and antitrust laws - protection 
of competition and consumers. 
450. See supra notes 346-53 and accompanying text. 
45l. See supra note 355 and accompanying text. 
452. See supra note 337 and accompanying text. 
Nicole Harrell Duke 
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454. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 12-19, 21, 22-27 (West 1997). 
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